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Abstract
This dissertation studies issues at the intersection of globalization, labor market, and pro-
ductivity in developing countries. It is composed of three chapters.
Chapter 1 studies how a country’s trade policy affects competition in its domestic labor
market. In a heterogeneous-firm model with oligopsonistic local labor markets, this chap-
ter demonstrates that opening up to trade can affect distortions in such markets. These
distortions arise because firms are large and able to exercise market power over their local
workers. Using a panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998-2007, I measure
firm-level labor market distortion, captured by the ratio between marginal revenue prod-
uct of labor and wage, and examine its evolution following China’s trade policy reform in
2001. The baseline measure of the overall distortion implies a 53% pass-through rate of
an idiosyncratic productivity shock to wage. The component of this distortion that arises
purely from labor market power accounts for almost 80% of the overall distortion. I find
that China’s trade policy reforms have led to a substantial net reduction in the labor market
power distortion, with large effects working through the liberalization of input tariffs. These
findings suggest novel effects of trade policy that deviate from the conventional trade models
featuring perfect competition in the labor market.
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of a large export shock on intergenerational mobility in
Vietnam. We use eight rounds of Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSSs)
spanning over almost two decades to measure intergenerational mobility based on education
levels of fathers and sons within households. Exploiting the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade
Agreement (BTA) in 2001 as an export shock and a difference-in-difference research design,
our analysis suggests that the BTA shock has led to substantial upward occupational mo-
bility, accounting for one-third of overall increase in mobility in Vietnam during our sample
period. We also show that this effect potentially works through improvements in educational
attainment. The results further reveal that both increases in exports overall and export
unit-value in particular have contributed to the upward mobility. Our results highlight that
international trade as an external shock can break down the persistence of socioeconomic
status across generations in Vietnam.
Chapter 3 examines two novel productivity effects of foreign ownership and foreign acqui-
sitions on Chinese high-tech manufacturing firms: the dynamic and the non-(Hicks)-neutral
effects. The dynamic productivity effect of foreign ownership arises because adoption of
foreign technology and management practices often takes time to fully realize. On the other
hand, since advanced production technologies tend to have non-neutral productivity implica-
tions in developed countries, meaning that they could be capital- or labor-augmenting, such
technology, transferred through foreign investment, can have similar effects in developing
countries. We propose an econometric framework to estimate both effects. Our framework
extends a recent nonparametric productivity framework developed by Gandhi, Navarro, and
Rivers (2017), in which identification is achieved by firm’s first-order condition and timing
assumptions. We find strong evidence of both effects due to foreign ownership. These effects
provide a more comprehensive perspective on the impact of foreign investment on firms’
productivity in developing countries.
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Chapter 1
International Trade and the Labor
Market Power of Firms: Theory and
Evidence
1.1 Introduction
The impact of international trade policy on labor market outcomes is a central topic in the
international economics literature (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016)). Although voluminous,
the majority of empirical work has been based primarily on the theoretical premise that
firms behave competitively in the labor market.1 This premise stands in stark contrast
to a recent empirical labor economics literature which documents that firms possess some
degree of market power in the labor market, and thus, can inflict distortionary effects on
the economy by engaging in non-competitive conduct therein (see for examples Card et al.
(2018), Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019)).2 Since labor market power is closely tied to
1See for examples the canonical models of international trade with heterogeneous firms, such as those in
Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
2Earlier discussions and empirical evidence on firms’ labor market power in the labor economics literature
can be found in Boal and Ransom (1997), Manning (2003), Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (2010), Ashenfelter,
Farber and Ransom (2010), and Dube et al. (2018).
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a firm’s performance, which is in turn affected by trade, this paper examines whether trade
policy can affect competition in the labor market and thus, alter labor market outcomes
through this channel.
Providing a compelling answer to this question is difficult for two reasons. First, from a
theoretical point of view, it is not obvious how firms, playing the central role as mediators,
transmit trade shocks in the product market to the labor market. In the presence of labor
market imperfections, characterizing this transmission requires making explicit assumptions
about competition structures in both the product and labor markets, the latter often missing
in theoretical trade models. Second, from an empirical perspective, firms’ distortions in the
labor market are not directly observable from data, and therefore, measuring the distortions
requires a consistent methodology. This paper offers a novel approach to both of these
problems and provides an estimate of the impact of trade policy on the labor market power of
firms, using Chinese firm-level data, with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001 as a historical policy experiment.
Formally, my analysis delivers three key contributions. I first develop a theoretical frame-
work to formalize the notion of labor market distortion at the firm level and explain the
mechanism through which trade policy affects firms’ competitive behavior in the labor mar-
ket. A distinct feature of this theoretical framework is that it embeds a generic oligopsony
competition structure in the labor market into a workhorse trade model with heterogeneous
firms as in Melitz (2003), and allows entry and exit of firms to affect competition within a
local labor market. Second, guided by the theory, I propose two complementary approaches
to empirically measure labor market distortion at the firm level: (1) a production func-
tion estimation approach; and (2) a regression approach that exploits a unique exogenous
demand shifter in China’s context, namely the US-China Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU)
shock. These two measures not only serve to cross-validate each other, but also help to quan-
tify the magnitude of the distortion that is entirely caused by the labor market power of
firms, relative to all other forms of distortion. Finally, using the resulting measures of labor
2
market distortion, I establish a causal link between China’s trade policy reform, specifically
reductions in both output tariffs and input tariffs, and the consequential changes in labor
market distortions.
To develop my results, I start off by deriving a “reduced-form” representation of the
labor market distortion from a simple firm’s profit maximization problem, following the
modeling convention in the misallocation literature (Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Liu (2019)).
A key result from this representation is that all sources of distortion in the labor market can
be nonparametrically summarized by the ratio between the equilibrium marginal revenue
product of labor (MRPL) and wage (w) paid by the firm, which I henceforth refer to as
the overall distortion. Since labor market distortion can arise due to a variety of sources, I
decompose the overall distortion into two main components: the exogenous distortion versus
the endogenous distortion. The exogenous distortion reflects the inefficient policy features of
the labor market, such as labor regulations and institutional constraints, and generally does
not respond to firm-level idiosyncratic shocks. On the other hand, the endogenous distortion
arises due to firm’s labor market power, and thus can potentially be altered by trade shocks.
How does trade policy affect firms’ labor market power distortion? To answer this central
question and provide theoretical guidance for my empirical analysis, I develop a tractable
trade model with heterogeneous firms and oligopsonistic competition in the labor market.3
The model has two distinct features. First, firms are assumed to be atomistic and compete
monopolistically within the national product market, as in Melitz (2003). Nonetheless, firms’
locations are distributed over a continuum of local labor markets, within which firms are
large employers and employ only local workers. Within each local labor market, I explicitly
model the oligopsony structure using a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
labor supply system, building on the recent microfoundations from the labor economics
literature, particularly as in Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019). Second, I allow for
entry and exit of firms following a sectoral trade shock, which consequently serves as the
3As will be shown later, the model shares similar flavors to trade models with oligopolistic competition in
the product market, for example as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015).
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main mechanism through which trade policy affects the distortion in the labor market. This
modeling approach is motivated by two robust empirical patterns that I observe in the data:
(1) there are massive entries and exits following trade liberalization within a local labor
market, and (2) firms’ local labor market share responds significantly to trade policy.4 To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first trade model that incorporates endogenous entry
and exit in an oligopsony context and allows them to affect labor market structure.
My model provides sharp and intuitive predictions for the impact of trade policy. To begin
with, in this model, more productive firms always have larger local labor market shares and
exercise more market power over their workers. Starting from an initial equilibrium, when
the Home country opens up to trade by lowering its output tariffs, the competitive pressure
from Foreign imports reduces each firm’s profit. Those firms at the margin, i.e. firms with
productivity level near the operating threshold, reoptimize and decide to: (1) stay or (2)
exit the market, whereas non-incumbent firms may decide to (3) enter. Since profit generally
decreases due to competitive trade shocks, the least productive firms exit; labor market share
is reallocated towards more productive firms; and thus, the average distortion increases. On
the other hand, when the Home country lowers input tariffs, it reduces production cost for all
firms that use foreign inputs, increases each firm’s profit, and induces entry of less productive
firms into the market. As these firms gain market share, the average labor market distortion
decreases.
Empirically, I tackle the measurement of the labor market distortion with two approaches.
My baseline approach exploits the “reduced-form” representation to measure the overall dis-
tortion. More specifically, since the distortion can be captured by the ratio between the
marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) and wage (w) paid by the firm, measurement of
the distortion translates naturally into estimation of MRPL, which can typically be obtained
by identifying a revenue production function. To this end, I adopt a production function
4Benmelech, Bergman and Kim (2018) document similar patterns for US manufacturing sectors. They
find that employer concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, decreases substantially
following the import competition shock from China in the early of the 2000s.
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estimation technique recently introduced in the industrial organization literature by Gandhi,
Navarro and Rivers (2017) (henceforth, GNR) to estimate a general, nonparametric produc-
tion function using Chinese firm-level production data. The GNR method is distinguished
from other existing methods, such as Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015), in that its identification is grounded in economic
theory, rather than in functional-form assumptions of the production function.
In the second approach to measurement, I exploit a unique exogenous demand shock to
Chinese firms, namely the US-China Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) shock, to identify the
endogenous distortion. This approach combines the insights from the pass-through and trade
policy uncertainty literatures, as in Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2018) and Handley and
Limão (2017), Pierce and Schott (2016), respectively.5 The intuition for the identification
is that the TPU shock technically acts as an exogenous labor demand shock. Therefore, by
observing the response of firms in terms of wage and employment, I can trace out the slope
and thus, elasticity of the labor supply curve. Furthermore, I allow for the pattern of the
response to be dependent on firms’ local labor market share, which consequently permits a
measure of share-dependent firm-level endogenous distortion computed from the regression
estimates.
From the empirical estimates of the labor market distortion, two main findings emerge.
First, the baseline estimates of the overall distortion from production function estimation
indicate that labor market distortion is pervasive among the Chinese manufacturing sec-
tors, with the average magnitude of the distortion implying a 53% pass-through rate of an
idiosyncratic productivity shock to wage.6 The endogenous distortion, which arises due to
firms’ labor market power, accounts for almost 80% of the overall distortion. Importantly,
throughout my 10-year sample of Chinese firms, I also find that key moments such as the
5Following China’s accession to WTO in 2001, the US moves China permanently from the “Column 2”
tariffs to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, and thus eliminates the possibility that China might face
surprisingly high “Column 2” tariffs rather than the MFN tariffs, which are already granted to China prior
to its WTO accession. It is also important to note that this TPU shock of US towards China is distinct and
uncorrelated to China’s own trade policy, which is the main focus of this paper.
6This pass-through rate would be 100% in an environment where there is no labor market distortion.
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mean, median, and dispersion of the distortion decrease over time.
With the obtained measures, I empirically assess the impact of trade policy on the la-
bor market distortion of firms, using China’s accession to WTO in 2001 as a major shift in
the country’s trade policy regime. My empirical model compares changes in the measured
distortion between firms located within the same local labor market, yet exposed differen-
tially to trade shocks due to their industry affiliations, following the popular approach in the
empirical trade literature, as in Pavcnik (2002), Amiti and Konings (2007), Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011), and Brandt et al. (2017). I find strong empirical support for my theo-
retical predictions. Qualitatively, increased import competition due to lower output tariffs
leads to an increase in labor market distortion. Even though the effect is consistent with the
theory, the magnitude and the statistical significance of this effect are small. On the other
hand, access to cheaper inputs due to lower input tariffs causes a significant decrease in labor
market distortion. I estimate that China’s lowering of input tariffs during the sample period
from 1998-2007 reduced labor market distortion by about 3% on average.
Summarizing the results, my analysis suggests that labor market distortions were substan-
tial and pervasive in China’s manufacturing sector during the sample period. An important
finding is that local labor market power accounts for a major part of overall labor market
distortion. Trade policy, by changing the aggregate profitability of a sector, can induce entry
and exit of firms across local labor markets, and thus, affects distortion in these markets.
These findings suggest novel effects of trade policy that deviate from the conventional trade
models.
Related Literature
Theoretically, my paper builds on the international trade and labor market imperfections
literature. Most related to my modeling approach of the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) labor supply system is the study by Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019). In their
paper, the CES labor supply system is micro-founded from the discrete choice model of each
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individual worker, much like how the CES demand system is derived.7 My contribution is to
embed this CES labor supply system into a canonical trade model of Melitz (2003), and allow
trade policy to affect the local labor market competition through entry and exit of firms.
By modeling the product market as monopolistic competition with constant markups, I can
abstract from the complication of strategic interactions in the product market and specify
a simple equilibrium selection rule to close the model, following the modeling technique in
Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo (2012), and Edmond, Midrigan and
Xu (2015). There are a few previous studies that also integrate labor market imperfections
into trade models with heterogeneous firms. Most recently, MacKenzie (2018) develops and
estimates a quantitative trade model with oligopoly in the product market and oligopsony
in the labor market, using Indian plant-level data. However, due to the complexity of the
strategic interactions in both markets, he has to assume that the number of active firms
in the market is exogenous, and trade affects the labor market power through changes in
product market power, a mechanism distinct from my model. Jha and Rodriguez-Lopez
(2019) specify a trade model with monopolistic competition in the product market and
monopsonistic competition in the labor market to reexamine the welfare implications of
trade. Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) and Amiti and Davis (2011) also incorporate
labor market imperfections into trade models. However, a common feature of these studies
is that, because labor market distortion is captured by fixed parameters, there is little room
for trade to endogenously affect the distortion.
Methodologically, my paper is related to the productivity, markup, and pass-through es-
timation literatures. Recently, productivity estimation has been used to measure and study
market power in product market, for example, as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
Flynn, Gandhi and Traina (2019). In trade literature, the impact of trade policy on mar-
ket power in product market has attracted a large attention, including De Loecker (2011),
7In a related framework, Card et al. (2018) also develops a microfoundation for the monopsonistic
competition structure of the labor market based the discrete choice framework. However, the monopsonistic
competition is not well-suited for my study because by setup, the labor market distortion is assumed to be
constant and cannot be affected by trade.
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De Loecker et al. (2016), Brandt et al. (2017). A growing literature has also adopted the
productivity framework to study market power of firms in factor markets, including Mor-
lacco (2018), Brooks et al. (2019), Dobbelaere and Wiersma (2019). A common estimation
framework used in these studies is the method developed by a series of papers, including
Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
(2015) (henceforth, ACF). A drawback to the ACF approach is that identification of the
production function requires a Leontief functional-form assumption, which in the Chinese
firm-level context significantly overestimates the labor elasticity and produces unrealistically
large measures of the labor market distortion.8
In this paper, I adopt the Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017)’s method (henceforth,
GNR) to consistently estimate labor market distortion at the firm level. My estimation
procedure does not impose functional-form assumptions and produces more reasonable es-
timates.9 To complement the production function approach, I also adopt insights from the
pass-through estimation literature, as in Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2018), to measure the
endogenous component of the distortion. In this literature, the pass-through of international
shocks to firm-level domestic prices is allowed to be dependent on firm’s market share within
an industry. The local labor market share plays a similar role in my analysis and permits a
variable pass-through rate from a productivity shock to wage paid by a firm.
Finally, my analysis of the labor market distortion in this paper is broadly related to a
large literature on resource misallocation due to market imperfections, including Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015), Morlacco
(2018) and Liu (2019), among others. In my analysis, labor market distortion is a form of
“labor tax” that potentially impedes a more efficient reallocation of labor in response to
trade shocks. My empirical results suggest that labor market distortion is large and on par
8I estimate labor market distortion using the ACF approach and show these results in Table A2 in the
Appendix.
9Recently, Lu, Sugita and Zhu (2019) also adopt the GNR approach to jointly estimate a constant
markup and variable wage markdowns, and study the impact of foreign investment on wage markdowns in
China.
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with product market distortion, yet only the latter of which has been incorporated into the
welfare calculations of trade, as in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), Arkolakis
et al. (2018), and others.
1.2 Labor Market Distortion and Theoretical Motiva-
tions
This section formalizes the notion of labor market distortion and develops a tractable model
to study the impact of a trade policy reform on firms’ competitive conduct in the labor
market. To achieve these goals, in section 1.2.1, I derive a “reduced-form” representation
of the labor market distortion from firms’ profit maximization problem, and conceptually
distinguish between the exogenous versus the endogenous components of the distortion. This
“reduced-form” representation is important, because it provides me with a nonparametric
framework to measure the overall distortion from production data, without having to impose
any structure on either the product or the labor market. In section 1.2.2, I develop a richer
model to capture the main sources that give rise to the endogenous distortion of firms. The
model also serves to clarify the mechanism through which firms endogenously respond to
changes in the competitive environment due to trade shocks.
1.2.1 Labor Market Distortion
Labor market distortion reflects inefficiencies in the labor market. These inefficiencies can
arise from policy interventions and institutional constraints, or via externalities and non-
competitive conducts of firms in the labor market. Regardless of the source and the in-
terpretation, labor market distortion can be viewed as a form of “labor tax” and has two
important properties. First, it raises the marginal wage cost: for every dollar spent on an
additional worker, firms have to pay an extra amount to cover the distortion payment. Sec-
ond, this extra payment reflects the size of inefficiency that inflicts a dead weight loss on the
9
economy due to firms’ suboptimal level of production.
To be as general as possible about its formulation, I introduce labor market distortion
into firm i’s profit maximization problem by classifying the distortion into two major com-
ponents: (1) an exogenous policy distortion and (2) an endogenous labor market power dis-
tortion (henceforth, the exogenous distortion and the endogenous distortion repsectively).10
The policy distortion is captured by a distortionary wedge χx and manifests as a uniform
“labor tax” imposed on the labor supply curve facing all firms within the same labor market.
This approach follows the modeling convention in the misallocation literature, for example as
in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Liu (2019). On the other hand, the labor market power distor-
tion arises due to an upward-sloping labor supply curve facing each individual firm w(Li).
A classic example of this distortion is when the firm faces a monopsonistic labor market
(Manning (2003)). In such an environment, the wage offer becomes a nontrivial primitive
function of labor supply and thus, gives the firm some degree of freedom to set the wage.
In what follows, I define the firm’s problem, and derive a “reduced-form” representation to
summarize all the distortions in the labor market for each firm.
Firm’s Problem
Firm i maximizes its profit by solving the following problem:
max
Li
Π(Li) = R(Li)− (1 + χx)w(Li)Li, (1.1)
where R(Li) is the revenue of firm i, as a function of labor factor Li. w(Li) is an arbitrary
labor supply function facing firm i. χx represents the policy distortion common to all firms.
Notice that this setup is general, in the sense that it does not assume that the labor market is
imperfect, nor that workers are homogenous across firms. Such generality is preserved in this
10The terms “exogenous” and “endogenous” here are used to describe the fact that the former type of
distortion generally does not vary across firms and does not respond to firm-level idiosyncratic shocks. On
the other hand, the latter type of distortion is dependent on firms’ optimizing decision, and thus generally
responds to firm-level shocks.
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simple framework because the labor supply function w(Li) is allowed to be a constant, i.e.
w(Li) ≡ w ∀Li, which corresponds to the case of perfect competition. On the other hand,
firms with heterogeneous workforce end up solving the same problem as in (1) if workers’
average ability acts as a Hicks-neutral productivity shock for each firm, as in Helpman,
Itskhoki and Redding (2010). For the most part of this paper, however, I abstract from this
issue, motivated by the fact that the majority of China’s manufacturing employment are
low-skilled.11
First-order condition (FOC) of the problem in (1) yields the following expression:





wi︸ ︷︷ ︸)wi (1.2)
= (1 + χx) ( 1 + χei )wi,
where MRPLi ≡ ∂Ri(.)∂L and wi are respectively the marginal revenue product of labor and the
wage paid by firm i in equilibrium. Let us further denote χei ≡ ∂wi∂L
L
wi
as the inverse elasticity
of labor supply curve. From the expression in (2), it is clear that distortions generate a
wedge between the equilibrium marginal revenue product of labor (MRPLi) and wage (wi)
paid by the firm. In a distortion-free economy where there is no policy distortion and the
labor market is perfectly competitive, i.e. χx = 0 and ∂wi
∂L
= 0, MRPLi is set to equalize
the wage wi as the firm seeks to maximize profit. The roles of the exogenous distortion χ
x
and the endogenous distortion χei in firm’s problem are illustrated in the panels A and B of
Figure 1.1.
Let us further denote χ̃i ≡ (1 + χx)(1 + χei ). From (2), χ̃i summarizes all the distortions






11In 2004, 88.4% of Chinese manufacturing workers do not have a college degree, of which 53% have only
secondary degree, and 35.4% finish high school.
11
The expression in equation (1.3) is crucial for this study for two reasons. First, the magnitude
of χ̃i directly indicates the pass-through rate of an idiosyncratic labor demand shock to
the firm’s wage, and hence, carries information about the response of the wage distribution
across firms to external shocks. Second, equation (1.3) provides a straight-forward algorithm
to estimate the overall distortion based on production data: given the data on wage, the
estimation problem of χ̃i transalates naturally to the estimation problem of MRPLi, which
I accomplish by identifying a revenue production function. This procedure is nonparametric,
in the sense that I do not have to impose any assumptions on the product market, the labor
market or production technology.12
It is important to point out that in the environment set up by firm’s problem in (1)
combined with the FOC expression in (2), the only source of endogenous wage variation in
this framework comes from the non-horizontal labor supply curve. In addition, because the
elasticity of labor supply depends on the exact position of the firm on the labor supply curve,
i.e. the exact value of wi or Li, the magnitude of this distortion responds endogenously to
firm-level demand shocks. Although being useful in guiding measurement and clarifying the
basic properties of distortions, the setup in this section is agnostic about what particular
sources give rise to the endogenous labor market power distortion of firms and thus, provides
little guidance on how international trade might affect such firm-level distortion.
1.2.2 A Model of Trade and Endogenous Labor Market Distortion
This section develops a partial equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms with oligopsonistic
labor markets and international trade. The goal is to build intuition for the source that gives
rise to the firm-level endogenous distortion, and for my subsequent empirical analysis of the
impact of a trade policy reform. A tradable goods sector is populated by a continuum of
Home (H) firms and Foreign (F) firms, indexed by their productivity z, producing differenti-
12In the labor economics literature, χ̃i is usually refered to as either the degree of exploitation of workers
by firms (Pigou (1924), Robinson (1969), Boal and Ransom (1997)) or the inverse of the wage markdown.
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ated goods.13 All Home firms are allocated to a continuum of symmetric local labor markets
indexed by n. A unique feature of this model is that firms are small within the sector, but
are large within a local labor market. When embedding trade into the model, I assume that
the Home firms only sell in their domestic market and compete with the Foreign exports
in this market. I also focus solely on a one-sided trade policy liberalization of the Home
country to obtain sharp predictions on how Home firms respond to trade policy shocks in
the labor market.
Utility Function
Product market demand and labor market supply are derived from the utility function of a
representative household of the economy. This utility function is specified as follow:
U = C− L, (1.4)
where C is the sectoral consumption index that increases utility of the household, while L is
the sectoral labor supply index that generates disutility to the household. The consumption
index C is a CES aggregator of the firm-level consumption c(z) within the sector, similar to















In equation (1.5), γ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution in demand for products
across firm z. ΩH and ΩF are respectively the mass of active Home fims and Foreign firms
in the Home market.
The labor supply index L is a multi-location nested CES aggregator, a modeling technique
I adopt from the recent labor economics literature (Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019)).
13In this section, since the productivity index z uniquely identifies each individual firm, I replace the
subscript i of firm from the previous section by the productivity index z.
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In equation (1.6), θ > 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution of labor supply across labor
markets indexed by n. NH is the mass of local labor markets within the Home country.
Furthermore, within each location n, labor supply is allocated across a finite number of










where η > 0 is the labor supply elasticity of substitution across firms z within a local labor
market n. Zn is the productivity set of all active firms in the local labor market n, with
the cardinality |Zn| = Kn.14 I assume that η > θ, which implies that firms are closer
alternatives within a location, as compared to firms across locations, in the representative
household’s perspective. Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019) provide a micro-foundation
for the aggregate labor supply system specified in equations (1.6) and (1.7), based on a
discrete choice model where each individual worker makes labor supply decision to each firm
to maximize his(her) utility.15 Their argument is similar to one employed in the product
market to justify the aggregate CES demand system, and is recently used elsewhere in the
labor economics literature as in Card et al. (2018). The structures in (4), (5), (6), and (7)
are now sufficient to derive the product demand and labor supply facing each firm.
14From this setup, the mass of Home firms would be ΩH =
∫
NH
Kndn. For symmetric local labor markets,
Kn ≡ K, Zn ≡ Z for all n, and hence ΩH = KNH .
15The labor supply system in this paper and in Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019) could be micro-
founded from either a static or dynamic discrete choice framework for each individual worker. As shown
in Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019), each worker has random preferences for working at a particular
firm, and the elasticity parameters η and θ govern the distribution of this random preferences, conditional
on the wage offers by the firms. This micro-foundation approach is used widely for the product demand
system that also gives rise to the nested-CES demand in equation (1.5) (see also Anderson, De Palma and
Thisse (1987), Verboven (1996)).
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Product Demand
From the aggregate demand system in equation (1.5), the demand function facing each firm
z is:
c(z) = p(z)−γPγ−1I, (1.8)
where P and I are respectively the exogenous aggregate price index and aggregate income
spent on the sector. Firm z takes the aggregate price index P as given in its optimization
problem because it is small within the sector, whereas the aggregate expenditure I depends
on the broader structure of the economy and is assumed to be predetermined. The aggregate












The Home firms only produce and sell in the domestic market. Firm has productivity level
z, incurs a fixed cost f in terms of a numeraire good, and uses labor as the only factor of
production to produce output y(z):
y(z) = cH(z) = zL(z), (1.10)
where L(z) is the labor factor use in production of firm z. The presence of the fixed cost f
allows for an endogenous form of entry and exit, which will be the main mechanism through
which trade policy reform affects the labor market equilibrium in this model.
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Labor Supply
From the aggregate labor supply system in equations (1.6) and (1.7), the labor supply func-
tion facing each firm z, located in labor market n, can be derived as:
L(z) = w(z)ηWθ−ηn Λ. (1.11)
In equation (1.11), Λ is an aggregate labor supply shifter of the sector at the national level
in the Home country. Recall that in this model, local labor markets are symmetric, thus








Since local labor markets are small as compared to the national economy, Λ is exogenously
given to each firm. However, in contrast to the product market, because firms are large
within a local labor market, the local labor market wage index W is endogenous from
firm z’s perspective. Due to this particular feature of the model, firms exhibit a strategic
distortion in the local labor market. In other words, firm z’s wage offer w(z) (or employment
level L(z)) affects the aggregate local labor market wage (employment) index.
Firm-level Equilibrium and Endogenous Distortion
A Home firm z chooses its price p(z) and wage w(z) to solve for the following profit maxi-
mization problem:
Π(z) = p(z)c(z)− w(z)L(z)− f, (1.13)
where each endogenous variable p(z), c(z), w(z), L(z) is subject to the constraints given by
equations (1.8)-(1.12).17 Given these contraints, the firm’s problem in (1.13) can be rewritten
16In what follows, I omit the subscript n whenever it does not cause any confusion.
17To focus on the endogenous distortion, notice that I have set χx = 0 in the firm’s problem in equation
(1.13), as compared to the problem in equation (1.1).
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such that the firm only has to decide the optimal employment level L(z), similar to problem
in (1.1). Taking the FOC, I obtain the following expression for the endogenous labor market
distortion of firm z:18






















Equations (1.14)-(1.15) provide key intuition for the sources of the endogenous distortion
χ̃e(z). In particular, χ̃e(z) depends on two key parameters: within-market (η) and across-
market (θ) elasticity of substitution of labor supply, and firm’s own local labor market share
sz. When the firm accounts for an infinitesimal share of the local labor market such that
sz → 0, the endogenous distortion reach the lower-bound of (1 + 1η ). On the other hand, a




upper-bound of the distortion in this model.19
Entry Game and Market Equilibirum
I allow for the endogenous entry and exit of firms within the local labor market in response
to aggregate sectoral trade shocks. This is motivated by the observed empirical patterns
that trade shocks induce endogenous entries and exits, and in turns, affect employer concen-
tration within local labor markets. The entry game follows closely the modeling approach
for oligopoly models in international trade, such as those in Atkeson and Burstein (2008),
Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo (2012), Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015). The only difference in
18The derivation of equation (1.14) is provided in the theory appendix.
19Recall that η is assumed to be greater or equal to θ. Therefore, 1θ ≥
1
η . When all firms are infinitesimally
small within the local labor market, the distortion converges to the constant 1η , which is equivalent to the
case of monopsonistic competition in the labor market (see also Jha and Rodriguez-Lopez (2019)).
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this model is that firms compete strategically in the labor market rather than in the product
market.
To start with, I assume that the Home firms within a local labor market play a static
Cournot game of quantity competition, i.e., firms choose the optimal employment level so as
to maximize their profit, incorporating the effect of its own action and the action of other
local firms on the local labor market. Each symmetric local labor market n has access to an
integer number of potential firms, with productivity being ranked as:
z(1) > z(2) > z(3) > ... > z(k) > ... (1.16)
I focus on the equilibrium where firms make sequential entry decisions based on the decreas-
ing order of their productivity ranking. In particular, the most productive firm z(1) makes
the entry decision first, followed by the second-most productive firm z(2), and so on. When
making entry decisions, each firm can compute perfectly what its profit would be, knowing
that all the more productive players have already entered the market. Firm z(k) decides to
operate in the market as long as its profit is greater or equal to zero:
ΠK(z(k)) ≥ 0. (1.17)
Notice that in equation (1.17), the profit function now has a superscript K. The sole purpose
of this superscript is to explicitly indicate that the number of active firms in the local
labor market enters the profit calculation of the firm z(k). Proposition 1 below defines the
equilibrium of the model, its existence as well as its uniqueness.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium in the environment set up by equations (1.5)-(1.12), in which
firms make sequential entry decisions based on the decreasing order of their productivity
ranking, is fully determined by the equilibrium number of active firms K∗ in each local labor
market. A unique equilibrium K∗ exists such that no firm has incentives to enter or exit the




Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that the number of firms K∗ sufficiently characterizes a market
equilibrium, and that a unique equilibrium with K∗ firms within each local labor market
exists. This unique equilibrium arises from the fact that firms are required to make sequential
moves by their productivity ranking, and from a so-called profit monotonicity condition,
specified as follows:
ΠK(z(k)) ≥ ΠK+1(z(k)) ≥ ΠK+1(z(k+1)). (1.18)
Intuitively, equation (1.18) states that more productive firms always have higher profit than
less productive firms given any market conditions (the latter inequality). Not only so, more
productive firms earn higher profit if there are fewer active firms, i.e., less competition, in
the local labor market (the former inequality). As a result, if one were to observe that the
firm z(k+1) operates in the market, it must be true that the firm z(k) also operates in that
market. The profit monotonicity condition (18) allows me to solve for the equilibrium using
backward induction, and to show that a unique equilibrium K∗ exists.20
Market Equilibirum with Trade Policy
Trade policy is modeled in this environment using two instruments: the output tariff (τO),
and the input tariff (τ I). The output tariff is the import tariff imposed directly on the Foreign
product cF (z) sold in the Home market. The input tariff, on the other hand, is the tariff
imposed on imported intermediate inputs used by Home firms in the production process. I
first focus on the impact of the output tariff on the market equilibrium, and then explore the
20As in any oligopoly-type models, there are multiple equilibria in this environment. However, these
equilibria are often intractable and uninteresting. By requiring firms to make sequential moves in a particular
order, I can turn attention to an equilibrium that is most informative. Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015)
shows in their quantitative exercise that the exact ordering of moves matters little in practice. The term
profit monotonicity is coined by Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo (2012) when describing the equilibrium in their
oligopoly model.
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implication of the input tariff when the production function involves an intermediate input,
which requires a slight modification of the production function in equation (1.10).
Trade shocks working through changes in the output tariff (τO) transmit their competitive
pressure to the aggregate price index, i.e. P(τO). This price index in turn shifts the labor
demand of firms, and consequently affects the local labor market equilibrium. To see this, in
equation (1.9), I assume that the mass of Foreign firms selling in the Home market ΩF are
subject to an ad-volerum tariff τO such that the price received by the Foreign firms, denoted
by pF∗(z), is a fraction of the Home market price pF (z):
pF (z) = (1 + τO)pF∗(z). (1.19)
To simplify the model, I also assume that the Home market is small enough so that ΩF can
be held fixed, and pF∗(z) does not respond to changes in the Home market environment. It is
straight-forward to rewrite equation (1.9) in the following form and show that the aggregate




















where Φ > 0 is an aggregate constant. As can be seen from equations (1.20)-(1.21), tariff
changes affect the aggregate price index P(τO) and shift the MRPL(z) curve. Firms observe
these changes in the aggregate environment, re-calculate their profit taking into account the
competition structure in the labor market, decide if they should operate, and if operating,
the optimal level of employment L∗(z).
From proposition 1 and starting from the equilibrium with a high-level output tariff, there
20
exists a “cut-off” firm which represents the lowest productivity firm operating in the market,
i.e. z(K
∗). When the output tariff is lowered, competitive pressure drives down each Home
firm’s profit. This makes the operating decision of low productivity firms near the “cut-off”
less profitable, for example ... z(K
∗−1), z(K
∗), and induces exit of these firms. As a result,
the equilibrium number of firms decreases, local labor market shares are reallocated towards
surviving firms, and the average distortion increases in the local labor market.21 I summarize
the implications of a change in the output tariff on the local labor market equilibrium with
proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium with Output Tariff) Under the environment set up by
equations (1.5)-(1.12), in which firms make sequential entry decisions based on the decreasing
order of their productivity ranking, lowering ouput tariffs (τO) induces exit of less productive
firms, reallocates local labor market shares towards more productive firms, and increases
the average endogenous distortion in the local labor market. Formally, K∗
′
(τO) ≥ 0, and for
∀z ≥ z(K∗), s′(τO, .) ≤ 0, χ̃e′(τO, .) ≤ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To consider the effect of an input tariff change, I need to modify the production function
in equation (1.10) to involve an intermediate input. Specifically, the modified production
function is as follow:
y(z) = cH(z) = zL(z)αM(z)1−α, (1.22)
where M(z) is the intermediate input used by firm z, and α is the factor share of labor.
Firms still need to incur a fixed cost f in terms of a numeraire good to produce goods. The
price of intermediate input is determined by the world market, i.e. perfectly competitive,
21This mechanism is similar to the canonical Melitz (2003) model. However, in Melitz (2003), there is
no labor market distortion. Jha and Rodriguez-Lopez (2019) allow for labor market distortion in Melitz
(2003)’s environment, but assume such distortion to be constant, and thus, not responding to competitive
trade shocks.
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and subject to the Home country’s input tariff (τ I). More formally:
pM = p
World
M (1 + τ
I). (1.23)
From the equations (1.22)-(1.23), lowering the input tariff has an intuitive effect on the
firm-level labor demand. Specifically, lowering the input tariff induces firms to use more
intermediate input, which through the production function, increases the marginal revenue
product of each worker. Therefore, in contrast to the impact of lowering the output tariff,
lowering the input tariff decreases production costs, drives up profit, and induces entries of
firms that ex-ante has productivity below the “cut-off” firm, for example z(K
∗+1), z(K
∗+2),...
Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect by the input tariff is magnified by a factor of 1−α
α
,
which is the ratio of factor shares between labor and intermediate input. The impact of the
input tariff on market equilibrium is summarized by proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium with Input Tariff) Under the environment set up by equa-
tions (1.5)-(1.12) and with modifications in equations (1.22)-(1.23), in which firms make
sequential entry decisions based on the decreasing order of their productivity ranking, low-
ering input tariffs (τ I) induces entry of less productive firms, reallocates local labor market
shares towards new entrants, and decreases the average endogenous distortion in the local
labor market. Formally, K∗
′
(τ I) ≤ 0, and for ∀z ≥ z(K∗), s′(τ I , .) ≥ 0, χ̃e′(τ I , .) ≥ 0. Fur-
thermore, compared to the output tariff, the impact of the input tariff is magnified by 1−α
α
,
the relative factor shares between labor and intermediate input.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 concludes my theoretical analysis. Before moving on to the empirical
analysis, it is important to point out that all the predictions in propositions 1-3 still hold
true if the product market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
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1.3 Measuring Labor Market Distortion
This section develops a production-based framework to estimate the overall distortion at
the firm-level. As will be clear shortly, identification of the production function, and hence
labor market distortion, comes from the plausible assumptions of firm’s decision making,
rather than any structural assumptions on either the product or the labor market. Section
1.3.1 sketches out an estimation approach based on a nonparametric method, building on
the recent work by Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017) on production function estimation.
Section 1.3.2 briefly describes the data on Chinese manufacturing firms used in estimation,
and section 1.3.3 presents the main empirical results of measured distortion.
1.3.1 Estimating Distortion from Production Data
My estimation strategy of the labor market distortion follows directly from equation (1.3).
To simplify notation, I omit the subscript i when it does not cause any confusion. It is
convenient to rewrite the expression of the distortion in equation (1.3) as a ratio between



















where r and l, respectively, are the natural logs of total revenue and labor factor.22 Denoting
the revenue elasticity of labor as θL ≡ ∂r(.)
∂l
, and the wage-bill share of total revenue as
αL ≡ wL
R






22Notice that the wage-bill share of total revenue here (αL) is the expenditure share on labor within each
firm, and distinct from the local labor market wage-bill share defined in section 1.2, which aims to measure
the labor market share of each firm within a location.
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Since information about the wage-bill is readily available in most production datasets, the
task now is to estimate the revenue elasticity with respect to labor (θL) from a revenue
production function. To achieve this goal, I begin by specifying a revenue production function
of firm in the log-form as follows:
rt = f(kt, lt,mt) + ωt + εt, (1.26)
where rt, kt, lt,mt are the natural logs of revenue, capital, labor, and material. ωt measures
the revenue productivity, i.e. revenue TFP, in period t, and εt is a random measurement
error. Here, f(.) is a revenue production function, and allowed to be nonparametric.23
Identification and Estimation of Production Function
To identify and estimate the revenue production function specified in equation (1.26), I build
on a recent nonparametric estimation method proposed by Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers
(2017), henceforth, the GNR method. As is common in the productivity literature, identifi-
cation of the production function in the GNR method is rooted in the timing assumptions in
decision making by the firm. However, in constrast to other existing methods such as those
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves
and Frazer (2015), GNR exploits an additional restriction derived from profit-maximizing
behavior of the firm with respect to materials to identify the revenue elasticity of this input.
In what follows, I provide a brief description of how I adapt the GNR method to identify and
consistently estimate the revenue elasticity of labor, θL. A distinct feature of my approach as
compared to the original GNR method is that I do not need to assume perfect competition
in the product market, since my goal is to identify a revenue production function.
My estimation procedure is implemented in two stages. In the first stage, firm’s profit-
maximizing behavior with respect to material is exploited to provide identification infor-
23The specification of the (log) revenue production function in equation (1.26) could be microfounded
within a large class of demand structures that dictate the firm-specific price as a power function of quantity.
See De Loecker (2011) for an example.
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mation for the revenue elasticity of material, i.e. ∂r(.)
∂m
. The intuition is that when firms
maximize profit with respect to factor inputs, revenue elasticities have to be equal to expen-
diture shares for all factors that are not subject to market frictions. In this case, I assume
that the market for material is relatively frictionless, and hence, material expenditure share
is informative about the revenue elasticity of this factor.24 Following GNR, in the first-stage,
I estimate the following share-regression using a nonlinear least-square (NLS) procedure:25
log(sMt ) = log
∂
∂mt
f(kt, lt,mt)− εt. (1.27)
In equation (1.27), sMt is the expenditure share of material obtained directly from the data,
and is defined as sMt =
pMt Mt
Rt
. The nonparametric elasticity function ∂f(.)
∂mt
is approximated
by a second-order polynomial sieve. The estimation of equation (1.27) provides me with two
ouputs to use in the second stage: the revenue elasticity of material ∂f̂(.)
∂mt
, and the random
shock ε̂t.
In the second stage, the production function is fully indentified using a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. Specifically, given the estimate of ∂f(.)
∂mt
and by
simple integration, production function f(.) is identified up to a constant C(.) as a function





f(kt, lt,mt)dmt = f(kt, lt,mt) + C(kt, lt) ≡ Dε(kt, lt,mt). (1.28)
Plug the expression in equation (1.28) back to the original specification of production function
in equation (1.26), I can rewrite the productivity term as:
ωt = (rt − εt −Dε(.)) + C(kt, lt). (1.29)
24In principle, material could be subject to market frictions as well. To alleviate the concerns about
frictions in this market, I control for an extensive set of exogenous state variables that could affect the
material demand decisions. Therefore, as long as firms do not possess market power in the market for
material, estimating its revenue elasticity from expenditure share would be consistent. This approach is also
used in other empirical work, for example in Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015).
25The derivation of this share-regression from firm’s FOC is provided in the Appendix.
25
Following the productivity literature, firm productivity is assumed to follow a flexible Markov
process:
ωt = h(ωt−1) + ηt, (1.30)
where ηt is an exogenous productivity shock to the firm at time t. Importantly, the exogeneity
assumption imposed here is that kt and lt are predetermined, and do not respond to ηt. In
other words, I assume that capital and labor factors are subject to planning, and chosen
based solely on the information about the expected productivity captured by h(ωt−1). The
only factor that responds to the productivity shock ηt is the material mt, the elasticity with
respect to which is already identified in the first stage. The Markov productivity process
in equation (1.30) provides exclusion restrictions needed to identify the function C(.). Let’s
denote Ψt ≡ rt − εt − Dε(.), and combine equations (1.29)-(1.30), I can now rewrite the
Markov productivity process as:
Ψt = −C(kt, lt) + h(Ψt−1 + C(kt−1, lt−1)) + ηt. (1.31)
Equation (1.31) nonparametrically identifies C(.) and h(.), and in turn, provides identifica-
tion of the revenue production function. Estimation of equation (1.31) is performed using a
GMM procedure.26 In my estimation, other than primary factors such as capital and labor,
I also control for a vector of state variables that may affect input demand decision of firms,
including year, location and industry fixed effects, firm’s ownership type, export status, and
tariff levels associated with the firm’s industry.
Compute the Distortion
Given estimates from the revenue production function, I can now compute the empirical
measure of the labor market distortion expressed in equation (1.25). Since εt is a random
measurement error, and does not affect firm’s labor demand decision, I need to correct for
26See details of this GMM procedure in section 1.B of the Appendix.
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this term in calculating the expected revenue that enters the denominator of the distortion in
equations (1.24)-(1.25). The estimation of equation (1.27) in the first stage does provide me
with an estimate of the measurement error, i.e. ε̂t. The measure of the distortion, therefore,











This final step concludes my estimation procedure for the overall labor market distortion,
which is based solely on the production function estimation approach.
1.3.2 Chinese Firm-level Data
The Chinese firm-level data comes from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises
(ASIE) from 1998 to 2007. This is a rather standard panel dataset covering all industrial
private firms with sales above 5 million Renminbi (RMB) and all state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) . The dataset encompasses more than 90% of industrial activities in China in terms
of gross output during the sample period (Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2014)). Table A1
in the Appendix reports the main aggregate statistics of this dataset, which matches with
published official statistics from the China’s National Bureau of Statistics, and confirms the
dataset’s quality. The dataset contains all variables required for the production function
estimation, including total gross output (revenue), capital stock, employment, material (in
monetary values). In addition, the dataset also contains information about wage-bill, own-
ership status, export, detailed geographical code, and firms’ four-digit industry affiliation.
My estimating sample consists of about 1.2 million firm-year observations, spanning over
10 years, and 427 four-digit industries. Throughout this paper, the unit for the local labor
market in Chinese firm-level dataset is county, which is the lowest-ranked administrative unit
that has authority to set labor market regulations such as the minimum wage policy and the
hukou household registration status. This administrative unit of the local labor market has
also been discussed and used in Hau, Huang and Wang (2018), Tombe and Zhu (2019). The
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final firm-level data cover 460 Chinese counties throughout the sample period.
1.3.3 Empirical Measure of Distortion
Table 1.1 reports the empirical results for the revenue elasticites and labor market distor-
tion across 29 two-digit Chinese manufacturing industries. Since my production function is
nonparametric, I can recover the distribution of each revenue elasticity and the firm-level dis-
tortion within each industry. Across all industries, my estimation procedure’s performance
is remarkably stable and produces an average capital elasticiy of 0.07, an average labor elas-
ticity of 0.08, and an average material elasticity of 0.75. The average revenue return to scale
(RTS), is 0.89.27 The average magnitude of the labor market distortion χ̃ estimated for
China’s whole manufacturing sector is 1.87, implying an average overall pass-through rate
of 53% of an idiosyncratic demand shock to wage. This pass-through rate suggests that,
for instance, of a productivity shock that increases marginal revenue product of a worker
by one dollar, only 53 cents is shared with the worker in the form of wage payment. The
median value of estimated distortion is 1.33, indicating that the distribution of firm-level
distortion is highly skewed to the right. Across all industries, both the mean and median of
the distortion are consistently greater than one. This empirical fact suggests that Chinese
manufacturing firms face pervasive frictions in the labor market during the 1998-2007 period.
Labor Market Distortion across Industries and Years
Given these estimates of the firm-level labor market distortion, I can now investigate its dis-
tribution as well as its correlation patterns across industries and years. Figure 1.2 displays
the evolution of labor market distortion distribution over three equidistant years within my
sample period: 1999, 2003 and 2007. As shown in the figure, across the three years, the dis-
tribution of distortion has shifted to the right, with decreases in both the mean and median.
27If one is willing to impose constant RTS of physical production to the whole Chinese manufacturing
sector, this revenue RTS implies the average markup of about 1.12 (or 12%) for the sector. This approach has
been developed by Flynn, Gandhi and Traina (2019) to estimate the markup for the US, with the magnitude
of US markup in the similar range to what I obtain for China.
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Furthermore, the dispersion of distortion distribution has also reduced substantially.28
In Figure 1.3, I show the patterns of correlation between the distortion and several two-
digit industry characteristics which might potentially be associated with the degree of labor
market distortion, including industry’s export share, state ownership share, high-skill em-
ployment ratio, and female employment share.29 The data for industry-level characteristics
is extracted from the firm-level data for the year 2004, when more detailed information is
reported for each firm.30 The top panels of Figure 1.3 illustrate that more export-oriented
industries tend to have lower levels of labor market distortion, while industries with higher
shares of state ownership exhibit higher levels of distortion. In the bottom panels, industries
that employ more female workers tend to have lower distortion, while the reverse is true for
industries with larger high-skill employment ratio.
Labor Market Distortion across Firms
To examine the correlation patterns of distortion across firms, I correlate firm-level labor
market distortions with measured productivity, employment size, export status, ownership
status, local labor market concentration, and local minimum wage. As shown in Table 1.2,
more productive firms have higher level of labor market distortion, regardless of the covariates
included. Conditioning on productivity, larger firms are associated with less distortion.
Columns (3)-(5) show that exporting firms and foreign-invested firms incur less distortion,
while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more distorted in the labor market.31
Importantly, local labor market characteristics seem to play an important role in deter-
28The reduction in the dispersion of the distortion typicall implies that there might be a lesser degree of
labor market misallocation over time. This rationale is applied elsewhere in the misallocation literature, for
example as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Lu and Yu (2015), Morlacco (2018).
29The high-skill employment ratio is defined as the ratio between the number of workers that finish high-
school and the number of workers that finish only secondary-school. The correlation patterns are also robust
to using finishing college degree as an alternative measure of skill level.
30The year 2004 is a China’s Census year, therefore, more detailed data is collected for each firm (see also
Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2014)).
31This is perhaps surprising, given the fact that workers at SOEs typically have lower marginal revenue
products (Hsieh and Song (2015)). However, this is consistent with state firms being subject to more frictions
in hiring and firing decisions, and in line with empirical results I obtain in section 1.4, where the labor supply
elasticity estimated from an exogenous demand shifter for SOEs is much lower.
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mining the firm-level labor market distortion. Column (5) shows that more concentrated and
lower minimum wage labor markets are associated with higher firm-level distortion. This
pattern is consistent with the existence of an endogenous source of labor market distortions
that arise from local labor market conditions, which I theoretically motivate in section 1.2,
and explore further empirically in section 1.4.32
1.4 Labor Market Power as Endogenous Distortion
As described in section 1.2, labor market distortion can be exogenous or endogenous to
firm-level shocks. In the sole presence of the exogenous distortion, the firm-level wage does
not respond to an idiosyncratic labor demand shock while employment possibly does. This
section provides reduced-form evidence that the firm-level wage does respond proportionately
along with employment to an exogenous demand shifter, namely the granting of permanent
normal trade relations to China by the United States, which was a major trade policy
uncertainty shock (henceforth, US-China TPU shock).
By comparing the responses of wage and employment to an exogenous demand shock, I
can quantify the magnitude of the endogenous distortion in the labor market. I will show
firstly that a firm’s responses in terms of wage and employment imply an upward sloping
labor supply curve, with an average elasticity of 2.07. This indicates that the magnitude
of the endogenous distortion accounts for almost 80% of the overall distortion measured by
the production function approach in section 1.3. And secondly, the pattern of responses is
dependent on the firm’s local labor market wage-bill share, which suggests the existence of a
strategic component of firms’ noncompetitive conduct in the labor market that is consistent
with the theory proposed in section 1.2.
To credibly identify firms’ wage and employment response to an idiosyncratic demand
shock, I use the removal of US trade policy uncertainty towards China, which is associated
32The HHI in column (5) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of employer concentration within a county,
which is the geographic unit of local labor market in this paper.
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with China’s accession to WTO in 2001, as a quasi-experimental demand shifter. The intu-
ition is that the removal of TPU increases the expected profit of entering the export market
or expanding export activities, and therefore raises firm-level labor demand. The measure-
ment of TPU and the behavioral response of firms towards TPU removal is modeled and
studied by Handley and Limao (2015), Handley and Limão (2017). In the context of China’s
accession to WTO, Pierce and Schott (2016) estimate the impact of the US-China TPU
shock on US manufacturing employment, and finds that the entry of new Chinese exporters
increases significantly following the TPU shock. Handley and Limão (2017) investigate the
impact of the US-China TPU shock on US’s imports from China, US prices and welfare.
Most importantly, these studies provide robust evidence that the across-industry variation
of the US-China TPU shock is largely exogenous from the perspective of Chinese firms. I
follow this literature in measuring the TPU shock, and treat such shock as random. How-
ever, different from this literature’s focus, my focus is on the relative responses of wage and
employment to infer endogenous distortions in the labor market.33
Formally, the US-China TPU shock at four-digit industry level is measured by the gap
between the “Column 2” tariffs and the MFN tariffs faced by the Chinese firms.34 Denoting





jt × sijlt) + β3sijlt + γi + γlt + εit. (1.33)
In the regression model (1.33), wi,t+1 is the observed (real) wage of firm i in year (t + 1).
35
33In Handley and Limao (2015) and Handley and Limão (2017), the labor market is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, and hence, there is no room for an empirical investigation of labor market distortions.
34“Column 2” tariffs are the tariffs assigned to nonmarket economies under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930. MFN tariffs are the tariffs offered to all members of WTO by the US.
35I use average wage, computed as the ratio of wage-bill and employment to measure the firm-level wage.
Wage-bill data is deflated using detailed industry deflators at the four-digit industry level to account for
any industry-specific trends, in the spirit of industry partial equilibrium models as in Melitz (2003). The
industry deflators are obtained from Brandt et al. (2017).
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τTPUjt is the US-China TPU shock to industry j at year t, and is computed as:
τTPUjt = (Column 2 Tariffsj −MFN Tariffsj)× PreWTOt. (1.34)
γi and γlt are firm and location-by-year fixed effects, respectively. sijlt is the local labor
market wage-bill share of firm i, in industry j, within the location l, and in the year t.
This wage-bill share is an empirical counterpart of the share defined in equation (1.15).





Equation (1.33) is estimated with two outcome varibles: the (log) wage and the (log) employ-
ment.36 I also estimate two versions of equation (1.33): one without β2 and β3, and the other
with β1, β2, and β3. The goal of this exercise is twofold. First, by comparing the average
responses of wage and employment to the common τTPUjt shock, I can identify the average
labor supply elasticity of Chinese manufacturing firms. This gives me an estimate of the
average endogenous distortion χ̃ei discussed in section 1.2.1. Second, by allowing for a firm’s
response to depend on its local labor market share, I can isolate the strategic component of
labor market distortion. This approach is used by Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019)
who study firms’ labor market response to tax policy changes in the US, and more generally,
in the trade literature to study the variable pass-through rate of international exchange rate
shocks to firm-level prices, as in Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2018).
Identification of equation (1.33) is obtained by comparing changes in wage and employ-
ment of firms within the same location, yet exposed to differential labor demand shocks





jt × sijlt) + β3sijlt + γi + γlt + εit. (1.33A)
One could notice that the equations (1.33) and (1.33A) form a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system.
Since the covariates are identical between the two equations, the OLS method would be equivalent to the
SUR estimation method.
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due to their industry affiliations. Any common time-varying local labor market shocks are
controlled for by inclusion of location-by-year fixed effects. To allow time for firms to adjust
their responses, and to alleviate a potential endogeneity concern of local labor market share,
I use firms’ outcomes in period (t + 1) as dependent variables to compute my estimates of
labor supply elasticity. The coefficents of interest are βh1 and β
h
2 , where h ∈ {w,L}. Standard
errors are clustered two-way, at firm-level and industry-by-year level, which is the variation
level of the US-China TPU shock in these regressions.
Table 1.3 reports the regression results of equation (1.33).37 Columns (1) and (2) report
results for equation (1.33) with the (log) wage as the dependent variable, and columns (3)
and (4) report results for the same equation with the (log) employment as the dependent
variable. Since the US-China TPU shock τTPUjt is measured in log-form, the coefficients can
be interpreted as percentage point changes. Let us first interpret the results from columns
(1) and (3). Without the share-related covariates, results from these columns show that
wage and employment both increased in response to the US-China TPU shock. Specifically,
a one percentage point decrease in the “tariff uncertainty gap” τTPUjt leads to a 0.066 point
increase in wage and a 0.137 point increase in employment. On average, the change in τTPUjt
associated with China’s accession to WTO is about 25 percentage points at the four-digit
industry level, implying that the manufacturing wage and employment increased 1.65% and
3.43% respectively, due to the reduction in US-China TPU. More importantly, for the purpose
of this study, these results suggest that the response of wage, i.e. dlog(w)
dlog(τTPU )
, is about half
the size of the response of the employment, i.e. dlog(L)
dlog(τTPU )
. This result in turn indicates the
average labor supply elasticity faced by a firm is 2.07. Computing the endogenous distortion
from this labor supply elasticity implies the magnitude of endogenous distortion of 1.48.
Compared with my average estimates from the production function approach in section 1.3,
this endogenous distortion accounts for 79% of the overall distortion. This is a key finding
37Due to a large number of fixed effects, many singleton groups are automatically dropped out of the
sample in my estimation procedure (using Stata’s -reghdfe- routine). Therefore, the number of observations
is smaller than those used for the production function estimation reported in Table 1.1. See also Correia
(2016) for more details on this estimation procedure.
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of the paper.
Estimation results in columns (2) and (4) further show that firms’ response is nonlinear
and varies by firms’ local labor market share. This is reflected through the sign and magni-
tude of βh2 . The interaction terms are positive and significant in both columns, suggesting
that the response of firms with larger local labor market share is weaker to the US-China
TPU demand shock.38 To be more specific about the implication of these interaction coef-


















Given the formula in equation (1.36), it is useful to look at the labor supply elasticity for
some particular values of sijlt. In Chinese firm-level data, the average local labor market
share has decreased from about 0.3 in 1998 to 0.18 in 2007. Plugging these numbers into
equation (1.36), an average share of 0.3 implies the value of η(0.3) is 2.05. An average share
of 0.18 implies the value of η(0.18) is 2.21. Firms with very small labor market share, i.e.
s→ 0, would face an elasticity of about 2.34, while firms that account for a very large share
of the local labor market, 0.8 for instance, would face a labor supply elasticity of about 0.6.
As a consequence, the endogenous distortion implied by the estimates in column (2) and
(4) is much larger for firms that are the primary employers within a local labor market, i.e.
these firms face a highly inelastic portion of the labor supply curve. To further illustrate
the variation of labor supply elasticity as a function of local labor market share, Figure 1.4
graphs the computed elasticity based on equation (1.36). The range of elasticity is from 0.6
to 2.5, with 95% of firms facing an elasticity ranging from 1.16 to 2.36.39
38This result resonates with the findings by Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey (2019), in which the au-
thors exploit changes in corporate taxes, rather than international trade shocks, to identify the endogenous
distortion for the US.
39The estimated coefficients restrict the ability to infer the elasticity for firm with labor market share
sijlt ≥ 0.882. This implies that there might be further nonlinearity in the response of firms to the TPU
shock, which I do not explore in this paper. However, there are less than 10% of firm-year observations
that dominate the whole market, and I exclude these firms in my subsequent analyses when it involves the
endogenous distortion measured by the reduced-form approach.
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The results in Table 1.3 provide clear evidence that an endogenous form of labor mar-
ket distortion exists. Such endogenous distortion accounts for almost 80% of the overall
distortion measured by the production function approach in section 1.3. Furthermore, the
distortion is significantly dependent on the local labor market share of firm. It is therefore
possible to come up with a measure of the endogenous distortion that varies by firms’ local
labor market share.
A Measure of Share-Dependent Endogenous Distortion
I use the share-dependent labor supply elasticity calculated by equation (1.36) to compute
a measure of share-dependent endogenous distortion, the variation of which arises due to
the actual variation of the local labor market share in the data. More specifically, from the
share-dependent labor supply elasticity in equation (1.36), this measure of the endogenous
distortion can be computed as:




Measure of χ̃e(sijlt) as in equation (1.37) is consistent with the theory in section 1.2. However,
it has a disadvantage: the only source of its variation comes from sijlt. In other words,
measuring the endogenous distortion from the reduced-form approach as in equation (1.37)
assumes that the structural parameters of the labor supply system in equations (1.6)-(1.7) are
constant across industries and years. However, this measure is still useful and can serve two
purposes: (1) it can help to cross-validate the measure of the distortion from the production
function approach in section 1.3, and (2) it can illustrate how the response of local labor
market shares to trade shocks translates directly to changes in labor market distortion.
To cross-validate the reduced-form measure with the production function measure, Figure
1.5-1.6 reproduce Figure 1.2-1.3, respectively. The evolution and correlation patterns are
remarkably similar between the two measures. Specifically, in the right panel of Figure
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1.5, the distribution of this endogenous distortion is becoming less dispersed over time and
associated with reductions in both the mean and median. In terms of industry characteristics
in Figure 1.6, industries that are more export-oriented and employ more female workers are
also associated with lower level of labor market distortion. On the other hand, industries
that have higher shares of state ownership and high-skill workers are associated with greater
distortions. The only differences between the two measures are the absolute level of distortion
and its across-firm dispersion, which is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1.5. Since
its only source of variation comes from the local labor market share, the distribution of
the reduced-form measure is much less dispersed as compared to the production function
measure. In section 1.5, I compare the response of both measures to a trade policy reform,
and show that they exhibit broadly similar patterns.
1.5 Impact of China’s Trade Policy Reform
A key interest in this paper is to understand how China’s own trade policy reform affected
labor market distortion. In section 1.5.1, I briefly describe changes in China’s trade policy
regime associated with its accession to WTO in 2001. In section 1.5.2, I specify empirical
models used to establish a causal relationship between China’s trade policy reform and firm-
level labor market distortions.
1.5.1 China’s Trade Policy Regime upon WTO Accession
China’s accession to WTO in December 2001 represents a major shift in China’s trade policy
regime over the past three decades. Upon accession, China committed to reduce the import
tariffs from an average of 16 percent in the pre-WTO period to an average of 9 percent in
the post-WTO period.40 This paper focuses on the impact of lowering the tariff barriers.
40Along with the reduction in import tariffs, China also made commiments to substantially reduce other
non-tariff barriers upon WTO accession. See Brandt and Rawski (2008) and Brandt et al. (2017) for more
institutional context of this event.
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Specifically, I consider two policy instruments: the output tariff (τO) and the input tariff
(τ I), the empirical counterparts of the theoretical policy instruments in section 1.2. Input
tariffs here are defined as input-share weighted averages of the output tariffs, using input
expenditure shares from China’s 2002 Input-Output table as weights, following Amiti and
Konings (2007)’s approach in measuring input tariffs. In particular, the input tariff for







where amj is the share of expenditure that industry j purchases from industry m, and τ
O
m is
the output tariff that China imposes on industry m.
In Table 1.4, I provide a summary of China’s tariff evolution over the sample period,
from 1998-2007. The cutoff event is at the end of 2001, when China’s official status in WTO
became effective. As reported in Table 1.4, along with a reduction in the level of output
tariffs, the standard deviation also fell from 9% in 1998 to 6% in 2007, implying that tariffs
converged to a more uniform level across industries. A reduction in the standard deviation
of tariffs across industries is evidence of the exogeneity of tariff changes, and is commonly
deployed in the empirical trade literature examining the effect of tariff liberalization on
domestic outcomes (see for example, Amiti and Konings (2007), Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011), Loecker et al. (2016), Brandt et al. (2017)). Intuitively, a decrease in the dispersion
of tariffs suggests that there is less room for the Home country’s goverment to cherry-pick
protection levels of specific industries due to political economy motives. For input tariffs,
the tariff levels decreased from an average of 11% in 1998 to 6% in 2007, and the standard
deviation decreased from 3% to 2% in respective years.41
41Due to the aggregation level of China’s 2002 Input-Output table, input tariffs only vary at the three-




To investigate the causal impact of tariff liberalization on the endogenous response of firm-
level distortion, I adopt a version of the empirical specifications widely used in the empirical
trade literature, for examples, as in Pavcnik (2002), Amiti and Konings (2007), Topalova
and Khandelwal (2011), and Brandt et al. (2017). The specification is as follows:
log(χ̃ijlt) = γO × τOj,t−1 + γI × τ Ij,t−1 + γi + γcic2,t + γlt + εijlt. (1.39)
In equation (1.39), the dependent variable is the (log) measured labor market distortion.
τOj,t−1 and τ
I
j,t−1 are the one-year lagged output and input tariffs for industry j, computed at
four-digit and three-digit aggregation level respectively. γi controls for firms’ fixed effects,
and γlt controls for location-by-year fixed effects, similar to the regression in equation (1.33).
Since my production function is estimated at the two-digit industry level, I supplement my
analysis with γcic2,t, which controls for any time-varying changes at the two-digit industry
level that may confound the results.42 The coefficients of interest are γO and γI .
43 Intuitively,
these coefficients are identified by comparing the differential changes of the outcome variable
across firms, within the same location-by-year and cic2-by-year group. These firms differ
only in their differential exposure to changes in tariffs at four-digit (or three-digit) industry
level. Across all the specifications, standard errors are clustered two-way, at firm-level and
industry-by-year level.
In my baseline estimate, equation (1.39) is estimated with the OLS method. Although
there is a large set of fixed-effects included in equation (1.39), there still might be an endo-
geneity concern of the industry-level tariff changes. Recall that, in my theoretical analysis,
productivity is a key determinant of firm-level labor market power. When China joined
42This additional fixed-effect term turns out to be important, since I observe some diverging trends in
measured distortions and productivity at the 2-digit industry level.
43An essential assumption for identification of the causal impact of tariff changes on the labor market
distortion using equation (1.39) is the constant treatment effect assumption, in which I assume that the
causal effects of tariffs are constant across firm, location, industry and time.
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the WTO in 2001, it is possible that the Chinese government selectively reduced tariffs
for certain industries based on their past productivity growth trends. If this is indeed the
case, differences in labor market distortion of firms across industry might be attributable
to industry-specfic growth in productivity rather than being caused by differential tariff
changes. I address this endogeneity concern by following the identification approach in
Brandt et al. (2017). Specifically, for the post-WTO period (after 2001), I use the maximum
binding tariff negotiated (and fixed) in 1999 as an instrumental variable for the actual ap-
plied tariff, and estimate equation (1.39) with the 2SLS method. This instrument alleviates
the policy endogeneity concern because it is presumably difficult for Chinese policymakers
to correctly predict the productivity evolution of various industries in the post-WTO period
and negotiate the maximum tariff levels accordingly. In what follows, my preferred quanti-
tative interpretation is based on the IV estimates, which are more conservative in all of my
specifications.
Table 1.5 reports the estimation results. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the
regression equation (1.39), using the (log) overall distortion measured in section 1.3 as the
dependent variable. Across the two columns, which use two alternative estimation methods,
i.e. OLS and IV, the sign and the significance of the coefficients estimated are consistent with
the predictions of theory in propositions (2) and (3). The coefficients of the output tariff
has a negative sign, while the input tariff coefficient has a positive sign. In other words, the
results show that a reduction in the output tariff increases the labor market distortion, while
a reduction in the input tariff leads to a decrease in the measured distortion. Quantitatively,
however, only input tariffs have strong and significant impact on the distortion. Specifically,
a one percentage point decrease in input tariffs leads to a 0.72 percentage point reduction
in the distortion, based on the OLS estimates. IV estimates imply a 0.58 percentage point
decrease in the distortion. Combining with the actual change in the input tariffs during my
sample period, in which the input tariffs decreased from 11% to 6% on average from 1998-
2007, these estimation results suggest that the average labor market distortion decreased
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about 2.9% as a consequence of China’s reduction in the input tariffs. Compared with the
effect of input tariffs, output tariff reductions had negligible and insignificant effects on labor
market distortion.
Columns (3) and (4) estimate equation (1.39) using the (log) share-dependent distortion
measured by the reduced-form approach in section 1.4 as the dependent variable. The goal of
these columns is to compare the results between the two different measures of labor market
distortion. Consistent with the results in columns (1)-(2), estimated coefficients for tariffs
have the same signs. In columns (3)-(4), however, the coefficients of both tariffs are strongly
significant, with the reduction in input tariffs having a much stronger effect. Across the two
columns, a one percentage point decrease in output tariffs leads to a 0.016 percentage point
increase in the share-dependent distortion in the OLS estimates, compared to an estimated
0.019 in the IV estimates. On the other hand, a one percentage point decrease in the input
tariffs leads to a 0.093 and 0.123 percentage point decrease in the share-dependent distortion
respectively in the OLS and IV estimates. Taken together and combined with actual tariff
changes during the sample period 1998-2007, columns (3) and (4) suggest that the output
tariff reduction led to a 0.133% increase in the distortion, while the input tariff reduction
led to a 0.62% decrease in the distortion (using IV estimates).
Overall, the empirical results in this section confirm predictions in propositions (2) and
(3) about the impact of a tariff liberalization on firm-level labor market distortion. Across
all specifications, my prefered estimates suggest that even though lowering output tariffs has
a tendency to increase the distortion, its effect is small. On the other hand, lowering input
tariffs substantially reduces the labor market distortion, with the magnitude of the overall
effect about 2.9%. These results hold robustly when using the alternative reduced-form
measure of endogenous distortion in section 1.4.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of international trade policy on competition in the labor
market. The paper makes three contributions. First, I develop a tractable model to study the
impact of trade policy on distortions in the labor market, providing clear predictions based
on this model. Second, I propose two complementary strategies to consistently measure labor
market distortion and show that the magnitude of this distortion can be large, contradicting
a critical assumption in many trade models that the labor market is perfectly competitive.
Third, I establish a causal relationship between trade policy and the endogenous labor market
distortion. A key takeaway is that opening up to import competition through lowering output
tariffs potentially increases the distortion in the labor markets. On the other hand, lowering
input tariffs can substantially decrease the distortion by allowing firms to access cheaper
foreign inputs. The proposed operating mechanism of such effects is the endogenous entry
and exit of firms across local labor markets induced by trade shocks.
My theoretical and empirical results have a number of implications for our understanding
of how trade policy affects labor market perfomance. Since labor market power has conse-
quential effects on wages, employment, labor shares and inequality, my results suggest that
trade can affect the labor market power of firms and thus, alters the labor market outcomes
through this mechanism. Even though the context of my empirical analysis is a developing
country, i.e. China, it is plausible that this mechanism also operates in developed economies.
A fruitful direction for future research is thus to analyze my results’ generalizability to a de-
veloped country context. Furthermore, as endogenous distortion accounts for a major part
of overall labor market distortion, my results suggest that standard welfare calculations of
trade, notably as in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), might be affected by
the presence of such distortion and its endogenous response to trade.
There are several important caveats to my analysis. My results concern the measurement
of labor market distortion and the causal impact of trade policy on such distortion, yet are
silent about its aggregate implications as well as counterfactual welfare impacts when there
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are changes in the trade policy regime. Additionally, difficulties can arise in quantitative
applications of the model because of the nonlinearity and the existence of multiple equilibria
in oligopsony context. Finally, I do not make claims on the relationship between trade, labor
market distortion and inequality. I leave these considerations for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Exogenous versus Endogenous Distortion in the Labor Market
Note: The figure illustrates the exogenous versus the endogenous features of the labor market
distortion. Panel A (left) shows the effect of the exogenous distortion that acts as a uniform “labor
tax” (χx) on all firms within a local labor market. Panel B (right) shows the effect of the endogenous
distortion (χei ) that varies with firm’s size.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the Labor Market Distortion (χ̃i)
Note: The figure illustrates the histogram (left) and kernel density (right) of the measured labor
market distortion (χ̃i) from production function estimation. The left panel shows the distribution
of distortion across all firm-year observations. No distortion cutoff is where χ̃i = 1. The right panel
displays the evolution of distortion distribution over three equidistant years: 1999, 2003, 2007.
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Figure 1.3: Labor Market Distortion (χ̃i) and Industry Characteristics (in 2004)
Note: The figure illustrates the correlations between the measured labor market distortion (χ̃i)
and (2-digit) industry characteristics in 2004. The industry characteristics include: export share,
state ownership (SOE) share, female employment share and high-skill employment ratio. High-
skill employment ratio is defined as the ratio between high-school and secondary-school degree
workers. The figure is based on the data in 2004, because this is the only year that the employment
composition information is available.
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Figure 1.4: Labor Supply Elasticity by Local Labor Market Wage-bill Share
Note: The figure illustrates the labor supply elasticity (η(sijlt)) as a function of local labor market
share in equation (1.36), with the estimated parameters obtained from regression equation (1.33).
p3 and p97 are the 3rd and 97th percentiles, with the values of 1.16 and 2.36 respectively.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of the Endogenous Distortion (χ̃e(sijlt))
Note: The figure is a counterpart of Figure 1.2, but for the endogenous distortion (χ̃e(sijlt)) rather
than the overall distortion (χ̃i). The left panel shows the distribution of distortion across all
firm-year observations. The right panel displays the evolution of distortion distribution over three
equidistant years: 1999, 2003, 2007.
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Figure 1.6: Endogenous Distortion (χ̃e(sijlt)) and Industry Characteristics (in year 2004)
Note: The figure is a counterpart of Figure 1.3, but for the endogenous distortion (χ̃e(sijlt)) rather
than the overall distortion (χ̃i). It shows the correlations between the measured endogenous distor-
tion (χ̃e(sijlt)) and (2-digit) industry characteristics in 2004. The industry characteristics include:
export share, state ownership (SOE) share, female employment share and high-skill employment
ratio. High-skill employment ratio is defined as the ratio between high-school and secondary-school
degree workers. The figure is based on the data in 2004, because this is the only year that the
employment composition information is available.
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Figure 1.7: Tariff Changes versus Initial Tariffs from 2000 (Pre-WTO) to 2007 (Post-WTO)
across Industries
Note: The figure illustrates tariff changes against initial tariff levels from 2000 (Pre-WTO) to 2007
(Post-WTO) across industries.
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Table 1.1: Revenue Elasticities and Labor Market Distortion by Industry
Industry Capital Labor Material RTS
χ̃i No. Obs
Mean Median
13. Food Processing 0.05 0.07 0.75 0.87 2.99 2.40 75778
14. Food Production 0.07 0.07 0.73 0.87 1.73 1.23 25439
15. Beverage 0.08 0.08 0.70 0.86 2.24 1.70 14498
16. Tobacco 0.10 0.10 0.70 0.89 2.33 1.61 261
17. Textile 0.06 0.08 0.76 0.91 1.79 1.42 115777
18. Garments 0.05 0.11 0.75 0.91 1.49 1.12 54948
19. Leather 0.05 0.10 0.75 0.90 1.71 1.19 28192
20. Timber 0.07 0.09 0.74 0.90 2.26 1.80 25140
21. Furniture 0.05 0.11 0.75 0.91 2.09 1.56 14436
22. Paper-making 0.06 0.09 0.76 0.92 2.19 1.80 42029
23. Printing 0.08 0.07 0.74 0.89 1.35 1.03 14624
24. Cultural 0.05 0.10 0.76 0.91 1.40 1.07 16147
25. Petroleum Processing 0.09 0.09 0.73 0.91 3.75 2.94 6414
26. Raw Chemical 0.07 0.06 0.75 0.88 2.05 1.46 87669
27. Medical 0.09 0.08 0.70 0.87 2.15 1.62 24615
28. Chemical Fibre 0.07 0.07 0.78 0.92 1.77 1.49 3428
29. Rubber 0.07 0.07 0.74 0.88 1.55 1.09 13997
30. Plastic 0.07 0.08 0.76 0.91 1.83 1.40 55530
31. Nonmetal Products 0.07 0.07 0.73 0.87 1.25 0.93 109209
32. Processing of Ferrous 0.07 0.11 0.76 0.94 3.90 3.31 25248
33. Processing of Nonferrous 0.06 0.07 0.76 0.90 2.90 2.26 16197
34. Metal Products 0.07 0.07 0.76 0.90 1.48 1.11 59290
35. Ordinary Machinery 0.08 0.07 0.74 0.89 1.52 1.12 85996
36. Special Equipment 0.07 0.08 0.73 0.88 1.66 1.17 41495
37. Transport Equipment 0.07 0.09 0.75 0.91 1.77 1.33 51499
39. Electric Machinery 0.07 0.07 0.76 0.91 1.79 1.28 68908
40. Electronic and Telecom 0.07 0.10 0.74 0.91 1.67 1.20 31385
41. Measuring Instruments 0.06 0.09 0.73 0.88 1.38 1.03 13606
42. Art Work 0.05 0.09 0.74 0.88 1.41 1.03 19214
All Industry 0.07 0.08 0.75 0.89 1.87 1.33 1140969
Note: The table reports estimates of the revenue elasticities of factors (capital, labor, material), the
revenue return to scale (RTS), and the measured overall distortion (χ̃i) from production function estima-
tion in section 1.3. Except for the distortion, all other statistics are the mean of respective distributions.
The table trims observations above and below the 1st and 99th percentiles. The last column reports the
number of observations for each two-digit industry. Notice that the RTS would not be equal to 1 in this
case because it contains markups. If I impose the constant RTS assumption of the physical production
function, the average markup of Chinese manufacturing sector is about 12%.
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Table 1.2: Labor Market Distortion and Firm Characteristics
Dependent Variable χ̃i χ̃i χ̃i χ̃i χ̃i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity (TFP) 5.187*** 5.442*** 5.496*** 5.529*** 5.836***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Employment -0.377*** -0.348*** -0.351*** -0.416***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)






HHI (Employer Concentration) 0.087***
(0.006)
Minimum Wage (Monthly) -0.002***
(0.000)
Observations 1,140,969 1,140,969 1,140,969 1,140,969 912,972
R-squared 0.350 0.390 0.396 0.398 0.430
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the regression results of the measured distortion (χ̃i) on firm-level char-
acteristics. The HHI in column (5) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of employer concentration
within a prefecture. Minimum wage data (at prefecture-level) is only available from 2000-2007,
therefore there are less observations in column (5). Fixed effects are denoted as FEs. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Wage and Employment Response to the US-China TPU Demand Shock
Dependent variable log(wi,t+1) log(Li,t+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τTPUjt -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.137*** -0.172***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.044) (0.045)
Market Share (sijlt) × τTPUjt 0.059*** 0.195***
(0.018) (0.024)
Market Share (sijlt) 0.015*** 0.189***
(0.005) (0.007)
Observations 1,140,969 766,851 1,140,969 766,851
R-squared 0.709 0.733 0.887 0.901
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Two-way Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the results of regression equation (1.33) with two dependent variables:
log(wi,t+1) and log(Li,t+1). Market Share (sijlt) is the local (prefecture) labor market wage-bill
share, defined in equation (1.35), and τTPUjt is the trade policy uncertainty (TPU) shock. Columns
(2) and (4) have less observations because of the use of lagged share. Fixed effects are denoted as
FEs. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered two-way, at firm level and industry-by-year level.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: China’s Tariffs Evolution from 1998-2007
Year
Output Tariff (τO) Input Tariff (τ I)
Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1998 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.03
1999 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.03
2000 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.03
2001 (WTO) 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.03
2002 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.03
2003 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.02
2004 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.02
2005 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.02
2006 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.02
2007 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.02
Total 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.03
Note: All tariffs are computed as the natural log of 1 plus the ad valorem tariffs i.e. ln(1 + τ).
Input tariffs are computed as weighted averages of output tariffs, using input shares from China’s
Input-Output table in 2002 as weights.
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Table 1.5: Impact of Tariff Changes on the Labor Market Distortion
Nonparametric Parametric
Dependent Variable log(χ̃ijlt) log(χ̃
e(sijlt))
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Tariffs (τOj,t−1) -0.039 -0.017 -0.016*** -0.019***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.006) (0.006)
Input Tariffs (τ Ij,t−1) 0.720** 0.577* 0.093*** 0.123***
(0.291) (0.318) (0.033) (0.036)
Observations 958,663 958,663 958,663 958,663
R-squared 0.758 0.764 0.689 0.712
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Two-way Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the results of regression equation (1.39) with two dependent variables:
log(χ̃ijlt) and log(χ̃
e(sijlt)). All tariffs are measured as the natural log of 1 plus the ad valorem
tariffs i.e. ln(1 + τ). Instruments for the applied tariffs (after 2001) are the maximum tariffs
negotiated before China’s accession to WTO. Obsevations with negative values of the labor supply
elasticity measured in section 1.4 are excluded. Fixed effects are denoted as FEs. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered two-way, at firm level and industry-by-year level. Significance levels:




1.A.1 Derivations of the Endogenous Distortion
Equation (1.14) is derived in several steps. First, the endogenous distortion can be expressed
as:



























η ] as in equation (1.7) and Λ′ is another exogenous aggregate labor
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(see also in Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey







Combine (A1), (A5), and (A7), I obtain the results in equation (1.14).
1.A.2 Profit Monotonicity
The profit monotonicity condition is stated as follows:
ΠK(z(k)) ≥ ΠK+1(z(k)) ≥ ΠK+1(z(k+1)). (A8)
Proof: The second inequality is proved first. This inequality states that, given the same
market condition, more productive firms always have more profit than less productive firms
(recall the productivity ranking z(1) > ... > z(k) > z(k+1)). The proof is by deduction: the
more product firm z(k) can always charge at least the same price as the less productive firm
z(k+1) and makes more profit. (Q.E.D)
The first inequality states that for the same firm with productivity z(k), the firm is more
profitable if there are less competitors in the local labor market, i.e. removing the firm z(k+1)
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γ summarizes the aggregate condition in product market, exogenous to
the firm. It is straightforward to show that:
∂Π(z)
∂L(z′)




The left inequality asserts that lower employment on the part of a local competitor increases
profit of firm z. This is because lower L(z′) reduces the wage of firm z′, and thus allow firm z
to set lower wage. The right inequality asserts that lower employment of a local competitor
induces firm z to increases its employment. These are typical properties of the Cournot
competition environment.
From (A10), by removing firm z(k+1) and essentially makes its employment L(z(k+1))→
0, all incumbent firms in the market becomes more profitable, and hence, ΠK(z(k)) ≥
ΠK+1(z(k)). (Q.E.D)
1.A.3 Proposition 1
Given the equilibrium selection rule based on productivity ranking in (18) and the profit
monotonicity condition in (20), it can be shown that a unique equilibrium K∗ exists. K∗
also fully characterizes all firm-level variables.
Proof: Suppose there exists two values K1 and K2 (K1 < K2) in this environment that
satisfy the equilibrium selection rule. By equilibrium definition we have:
ΠK1(z(K1)) ≥ 0 > ΠK1+1(z(K1+1)) and ΠK2(z(K2)) ≥ 0 > ΠK2+1(z(K2+1)) (A11)
Nonetheless, by productivity ranking, we must have: z(K1+1) ≥ z(K2) since K1 < K2. Com-
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bine with the profit monotonicity condition proved in section 1.A.2, we must have:
0 > ΠK1+1(z(K1+1)) ≥ ΠK2(z(K2)) ≥ 0. (A12)
This condition clearly cannot hold. Therefore the equilibrium K∗ is unique. From (A9),
and given the set of firm productivies, K∗ determines all firm-level variables in equilibrium.
(Q.E.D)
1.A.4 Proposition 2
Proposition 2 states three main results: K∗
′
(τO) ≥ 0, and for z ≥ z(K∗), s′(τO, .) ≤ 0,
χ̃e
′
(τO, .) ≤ 0.
I first prove thatK∗
′
(τO) ≥ 0. Recall from equation (1.22) that P′(τO) ≥ 0, because lower
output tariff increases competition and decreases the aggregate price. Plug this condition
into equation (A9), it is straightforward to see that Π′(τO, .) ≥ 0 for all z, holding the labor
market condition constant. Suppose there exists two alternative scenarios of trade policy
environment τO1 > τ
O
2 , such that K
∗(τO1 ) ≡ K∗1 < K∗(τO2 ) ≡ K∗2 .
Consider the firm z(K
∗
1+1). By the equilibrium definition in proposition 1, we must have
ΠK
∗
1 (z(K1+1)) < 0 and ΠK
∗
2 (z(K1+1)) ≥ 0. Notice also that from the profit monotonicity
condition, we must have ΠK
∗
2 (z(K1+1)) ≤ ΠK∗1 (z(K1+1)). Combine these inequalities, we have:
ΠK
∗
1 (z(K1+1)) < 0 ≤ ΠK∗2 (z(K1+1)) ≤ ΠK∗1 (z(K1+1)). (A13)
Expressions in (A13) clearly can not hold. Therefore, it must be true that as τO1 > τ
O
2 , then
K∗(τO1 ) ≡ K∗1 ≥ K∗(τO2 ) ≡ K∗2 . (Q.E.D)
Second, to show that for all incumbent firms z ≥ z(K∗), the local labor market share
















Consider again τO1 > τ
O
2 , we know that K
∗
1 ≥ K∗2 . I will show that s
K∗1
z (τO1 ) = s
K∗1
z (τO2 ) ≤
s
K∗2
z (τO2 ). In plain words, the first equality states that in this environment, holding fixed the
number of firms in the local labor market, the aggregate sectoral condition has no effect on
the local labor market share of firms, and thus, on the endogenous distortion.44 The second
inequality states that holding the aggregate condition unchanged, the firm z has a bigger
market share if there are fewer competitors in the labor market. The first equality is the
key to this proof. To show that the first equality holds, I rewrite the FOC of firm’s problem
































). Combine the FOCs of
each firm in equation (A8), for any value of τO, we have a system of K∗ equations with K∗
variables L(z(1)), ..., L(z(K
∗)).
Plug into (A15) the values of τO1 and τ
O
2 , and holding K
∗ fixed, we have two systems of












































θ . Notice that the system (A16) and (A17) are two isomorphic systems





44MacKenzie (2018) circumvents this problem by allowing firms to have variable markups, but holding
fixed the number of active firms. My solution is to allow for firms’ endogenous entry and exit to affect the
local labor market share.
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a respective equation in system (A16). It follows that if {L(z)|z ∈ ZK∗} is a solution to
system (A17), then it must be true that {λL(z)|z ∈ ZK∗} is a solution to system (A16) and
inversely. The system of equations in (A15)-(A17) in principle can have multiple solutions
due to its nonlinearity. Therefore, I assume that a unique and stable solution exists and
focus only on this solution. Since any L(z) is scaled by a constant factor λ under the two
alternative tariff scenarios, the local labor market share expressed in (A14) would remain
unchanged. As a result, we have s
K∗1
z (τO1 ) = s
K∗1
z (τO2 ).
To show that s
K∗1
z (τO2 ) ≤ s
K∗2
z (τO2 ), recall the second inequality from (A10). From this
condition, we know that when the number of competitors decreases and holding the ag-
gregate condition fixed, incumbent firms have incentives to increase employment, taking
extra labor of the firm that do not operate under K∗2 environment (L
K∗2 (z) ≥ LK∗1 (z)).



















η ). Combine these two inequalities, we
have s
K∗1
z (τO2 ) ≤ s
K∗2
z (τO2 ). As market share changes, the distortion changes in the same
direction, following directly from equation (1.14). (Q.E.D)
1.A.5 Proposition 3
The proof for proposition 3 follows straightforwardly from the proof for proposition 2. The
only difference now is that the impact of input tariff is magnified by 1−α
α
, the relative factor
shares between labor and intermediate input.
To see this, notice that change in input tariff τ I affects the competition in the labor
market through a similar channel as output tariff τO, that is they both affect the labor
demand MRPL. Therefore, all arguments in the proof for proposition 2 apply. The goal is
now to show that the effect of input tariff on the competition in the labor market could be
much larger than that of output tariff, especially if the production uses intermediate input
heavily. From the production function in equation (1.22), I can derive the MRPL of firm z
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as:
MRPL(z) = zαL(z)α−1M(z)1−α. (A18)
From equation (A18), conditional on the same amount of labor L(z), change in labor demand
is determined by:
dlog(MRPL(z)) = (1− α)dlog(M(z)). (A19)
From the FOC condtion of firm z with respect to M(z), I obtain:
dlog(M(z)) = − 1
α
dlog(1 + τ I). (A20)
Combine (A19) and (A20), change in labor demand as a result of change in input tariff is:
dlog(MRPL(z)) = −1− α
α
dlog(1 + τ I). (A21)
Equation (A21) conludes the proof for proposition 3. (Q.E.D)
1.B Production Function Estimation
This section provides supplementary notes for production function estimation procedure in
section 1.3. In particular I provide the detailed derivations of firm’s profit maximization
problem, timing assumptions as well as the moment conditions for the second GMM stage.
A firm maximizes its profit with respect to material input conditional on its information set
in period t, denoted by It as follow:
max
Mt
E[F (kt, lt,mt) ∗ e(ωt+εt)|It]− pMtMt, (B1)
where F (.) and Mt are the exponential counterparts of f(.) and mt in equation (1.26) respec-






ωtE[eεt ]− pMt = 0. (B2)
Taking the log version of the above equation, I obtain:
log(sMt ) ≡ log
pMtMt
Rt







f(kt, lt,mt)− εt. (B3)
The second equality of (B3) (also equation (1.27)) follows under the assumption that E[eεt ] =
1 or E[εt] = 0. In my empirical implementation, I estimate ε̂t and correct for any asymmetry
in the measurement error εt (see also in Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017)). In the Chinese
firm-level data, the estimated ε̂t exhibits little asymmetry and requires minimum correction,
i.e. E[eε̂t ] ≈ 1 for most industries.
In what follows, vt is a vector of additional state variables that I control for, includ-
ing year, location, industry, firm’s ownership, export status and tariff levels. The timing
assumptions of the GNR productivity model is as follows:
• At the end of period (t− 1), the firm chooses (kt, lt,vt) and whether to exit at t.
• At the beginning of period t, ηt (and hence ωt) realizes. The firm observes their
productivity for period t.
• The firm optimally chooses mt, after which εt realizes and completely determines rt.
• At the end of t, the firm chooses (kt+1, lt+1,vt+1) and whether to exit at t+1, repeating
the same process.
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1.C Data Construction and Filtering
The China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE) data record firms’ balance
sheets information and contain a firm-specific identifier (ID). Firms could change ID over
time due to various reasons (e.g. due to M&A activity). I match firms over the years in the
sample first based on their IDs. After matching on IDs, I match firms based on name, zip
code, telephone number, and legal person representatives concurrently.
In my final sample, I drops all firms with missing or negative values of the main variables,
including revenue, fixed assets, employment, material, wage-bill. To maintain consistent
thresholds throughout the sample, I drop all firms that employ fewer than 8 workers or
firms that have revenue less than 5 million Renminbi (RMB). Since my production function
estimation is at two-digit industry level, I drop all firms that switch 2-digit industry to avoid
complex selection bias of production function estimation due to firms switching two-digit
industry. This procedure reduces 18% of firm-year observations. I further drop all firms
outside the 1st and 99th pecentiles of revenue, fixed assets, employment, material, wage-
bill. This procedure shrinks the data by 5 percentage point. My cleaning procedures are
similar to standard practices in the literature that uses ASIE data, see for example Brandt,
Biesebroeck and Zhang (2014) and Brandt et al. (2017).
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1.D Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Changes in Tariffs over Time (Pre-Post WTO)
Note: The figure illustrates changes in the average and interquartile range of applied tariffs (AHS)
across 6-digit HS industries over time (pre-post WTO).
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Figure A2: Applied Tariffs (AHS) versus Binding Tariffs (BND)
Note: The figure illustrates changes in the (average) applied tariffs (AHS) and binding tariffs (BND)
over time.
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Figure A3: Convergence of Applied Tariffs (AHS) to Binding Tariffs (BND) across Industries
and Years
Note: The figure illustrates changes in the applied tariffs (AHS) and binding tariffs (BND) across
industries after WTO accession. The base year is 2000.
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Table A1: Aggregate Summary Statistics of the Chinese Firm-level Data
Year No. of Firms VA Sales Output Employment Export Fixed Assets (Net)
1998 165118 1.94 6.54 6.77 56.44 1.08 4.41
1999 162033 2.16 7.06 7.27 58.05 1.15 4.73
2000 162882 2.54 8.37 8.57 53.68 1.46 5.18
2001 171256 2.83 9.19 9.54 54.41 1.62 5.54
2002 181557 3.30 10.86 11.08 55.21 2.01 5.95
2003 196220 4.20 13.95 14.23 57.48 2.69 6.61
2004 279092 6.62 19.78 20.17 66.22 4.05 7.97
2005 271835 7.22 24.69 25.16 69.31 4.77 8.95
2006 301961 9.11 31.08 31.66 73.49 6.05 10.58
2007 336768 11.70 39.76 40.51 78.75 7.34 12.34
Note: The table reports the aggregate summary statistics of the Chinese firm-level data, prior to
cleaning procedures. Employment is in millions of workers. All monetary values are denoted in
trillions Renminbi (RMB).
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Table A2: Revenue Elasticities and Labor Market Distortion by Industry (ACF-Translog)
Industry Capital Labor Material χ̃i (Mean)
13. Food Processing 0.19 0.19 . 6.94
14. Food Production 0.21 0.19 . 3.58
15. Beverage 0.21 0.06 . 1.23
16. Tobacco 0.39 0.33 . 3.10
17. Textile 0.22 0.21 . 3.50
18. Garments 0.14 0.35 . 3.16
19. Leather 0.17 0.26 . 2.86
20. Timber 0.25 0.25 . 4.68
21. Furniture 0.14 0.34 . 4.73
22. Paper-making 0.23 0.21 . 4.24
23. Printing 0.19 0.08 . 1.03
24. Cultural 0.16 0.26 . 2.80
25. Petroleum Processing 0.25 0.19 . 4.75
26. Raw Chemical 0.23 0.13 . 2.71
27. Medical 0.27 0.15 . 2.60
28. Chemical Fibre 0.33 0.19 . 5.22
29. Rubber 0.19 0.10 . 1.55
30. Plastic 0.20 0.22 . 3.81
31. Nonmetal Products 0.19 0.04 . 0.47
32. Processing of Ferrous 0.30 0.26 . 7.13
33. Processing of Nonferrous 0.22 0.20 . 5.79
34. Metal Products 0.21 0.19 . 2.93
35. Ordinary Machinery 0.19 0.12 . 1.72
36. Special Equipment 0.16 0.14 . 1.87
37. Transport Equipment 0.25 0.27 . 4.32
39. Electric Machinery 0.25 0.23 . 4.05
40. Electronic and Telecom 0.21 0.35 . 4.83
41. Measuring Instruments 0.13 0.13 . 1.28
42. Art Work 0.15 0.17 . 1.73
All Industry 0.21 0.20 . 3.40
Note: This table reports estimates of the revenue elasticities of factor inputs: capital and labor, and
the measured overall distortion (χ̃i), using the translog production function estimation procedure
in Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) (ACF). All statistics are the mean of respective distribu-
tions. The ACF method assumes that production function is Leontief, i.e. perfect complementarity
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Chapter 2
Trade, Labor Markets, and
Intergenerational Mobility in Vietnam
(joint work with Devashish Mitra and Beyza Ural-Marchand)
2.1 Introduction
Intergenerational mobility refers to the extent to which socioeconomic status is able to change
across generations. By many standards, it is a key element of human progress (World Bank
(2018)). And yet, while intergenerational mobility has been studied extensively in labor
economic literature (see for example Solon (1999), Chetty et al. (2014), Chetty and Hendren
(2018b), Chetty and Hendren (2018a)), little is known about the relationship between social
mobility across generations, economic development and international trade. Given that
globalization has played a major role in promoting economic growth around the world in
the past decades, it is important to ask whether international trade, as an external shock,
reinforces or breaks down the persistence of socioeconomic status across generations. In this
paper, we examine to what extent trade liberalization affects intergenerational mobility in a
small but rapidly developing country, Vietnam.
It is noteworthy to first clarify why intergenerational mobility matters. From a the-
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oretical perspective, if mobility is impeded by factors such as market imperfections and
inefficient social mechanisms, for instance credit market imperfections or caste-based soci-
ety, greater mobility implies a more efficient allocation of resources. Furthermore, from an
empirical perspective, more intergenerational mobility is found to be highly associated with
higher economic growth, faster poverty reduction, lower inequality and a more stable society
(World Bank (2018)). If mobility is structurally related to these desirable aspects of society,
enhancing mobility can have meaningful and long-term impacts on development.
To shed light on the impacts of international trade on intergenerational mobility, we use
eight rounds of Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) from 2001/2002 to
2015/2016 to measure intergenerational mobility, and exploit a large and exogenous export
shock in Vietnam induced by United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (henceforth,
BTA) to identify the impacts. This empirical context is ideal to answer our question because
Vietnam is a good example of a developing economy that has experienced fast growth as
well as many structural changes, while at the same time has benefited immensely from trade
openness during this sample period. We focus our attention on occupational mobility as our
main dimension of mobility because (1) occupation is likely to be directly related to workers’
welfare through corresponding income and job stability and (2) occupation is reflective of
skills, which are influenced by trade. In addition, in the context of a developing country such
as Vietnam, having a formal job plays a particularly important role in poverty alleviation
and welfare of workers (World Development Report (2006), Emran and Shilpi (2011)).1
The US-Vietnam BTA was a major trade shock and has had very large impacts on
Vietnam’s trade and economic growth. The BTA took effect in December 2001. Following
its implementation, US’s tariffs on their imports from Vietnam decreased from an average of
more than 23% to about 2.5%. The BTA tariff reductions were large and allowed Vietnam
immediate access to the large and prolific US market. An attractive feature of the BTA shock
1In Emran and Shilpi (2011), Vietnam is considered a “rural” economy with a very large share of workers
in the agriculture sectors. As will be clear in section 2.2, this is indeed the case. Even until 2016, 44.53% of
workers are in farm-related sectors.
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is that the US’s tariff reductions for Vietnam were plausibly exogenous (McCaig (2011),
McCaig and Pavcnik (2018)). We therefore exploit the BTA tariff reductions to identify the
impact of trade shocks on intergenerational mobility in our analysis.
Our analysis in this paper delivers three key contributions to the current literature on
trade and intergenerational mobility. First, we find that the BTA has raised occupational
mobility by about 5.11 percentage points, accounting for almost one-third of overall increase
in mobility in Vietnam during our sample period from 2002 to 2016. The effect of the BTA
is larger in the long-run than in the short-run. Second, we show that the BTA might have
also worked through higher educational attainment of younger generations i.e. sons. Finally,
we also show that both improvements in Vietnam’s export value overall as well as unit-value
in particular are channels through which the BTA affects occupational mobility.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to the broad literature on trade, labor markets and inequality. Most
closely related to our paper is a paper by Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017) in which they study
the impact of trade liberalization on intergenerational occupational mobility in India. Ahsan
and Chatterjee (2017) is the very first study that examines international trade as a potential
determinant of mobility. They find that following India’s trade liberalization in 1991, sons
living in the urban districts with greater exposure to trade liberalization are more likely to
have better occupations as compared to their fathers. Our findings in this paper are different
from their findings in three important ways. First, our paper focuses on the impacts of export
liberalization due to tariff reductions by a trading partner, in this case the US, rather than
import competition liberalization by the home country. Second, in terms of methodology,
multiple rounds of household survey data permit a difference-in-difference (DID) research
design and allow us to examine the short- and long-run effects of trade shocks. In contrast,
Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017) only use cross-sectional variations in their empirical strategy.
Finally, we are able to purge a link between improvements in both exports and unit-value
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(proxied for quality) on skill demand and mobility. These differences allow us to make new
contributions to the scant literature on trade and intergenerational mobility.
The literature on trade and inequality has provided empirical evidence that even though
trade is beneficial overall, it can raise inequality (Verhoogen (2008), Helpman et al. (2017)).
In most of these studies, the main empirical interest is cross-sectional (horizontal) inequality.
Similar to Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017), we show that trade liberalization can nevertheless
promote equality of opportunities by improving intergenerational mobility and reduce in-
equality along this (vertical) dimension.
Methodologically, our paper is related to a large literature on trade and labor market that
employs local labor market approach. In particular, we measure trade exposure following
Hasan, Mitra and Ural (2007), Topalova (2010), McCaig (2011), Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) and Kovak (2013). This empirical approach has an advantage in that it is grounded
in the specific-factors model of local economies as shown in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013)
and Kovak (2013).2 We adopt this approach in our analysis in which the units of local labor
market are provinces and central cities in Vietnam.3
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we describe our Vietnam household
survey data and provide descriptive analyses of the labor market in Vietnam during our
sample period from 2002 to 2016. Section 2.3 describes how we measure intergenerational
occupational mobility and several patterns of mobility in Vietnam. Section 2.4 summarizes
background on Vietnam’s international trade. In sections 2.5 and 2.6, we estimate the impact
of the BTA on mobility and explore its mechanisms. Section 2.7 concludes.
2In the general economics literature, this local labor market approach dates back to Bartik (1991).
3Provinces and central cities are equivalent administrative units in Vietnam. To simplify the narrative,
we use provinces to represent both the actual provinces and central cities in this paper.
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2.2 Some Analyses of Labor Market in Vietnam 2001/2002
- 2015/2016
Before analyzing changes in intergenerational mobility, we characterize main features of Viet-
nam’s labor market during our sample period from 2001/2002 to 2015/2016 using Vietnam
Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) data. This section first describes the house-
hold survey data and then provides descriptive statistics regarding trends in labor market’s
demographic characteristics, occupational and sectoral structures, which eventually helps us
to purge a link between changes in overall labor market conditions and intergenerational
mobility.
2.2.1 Household Survey Data
Our main data source are Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) from
2001/2002 to 2015/2016, which are representative and implemented biennially by Vietnam’s
General Statistics Office (GSO). The stated goals of VHLSSs are to “monitor systematically
the living standard of Vietnam’s societies” and to “exercise the monitoring and assessment of
the implementation of the Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation and Growth Strategy defined
in Country Strategy Paper approved by the Government Prime Minister” (The World Bank
(2015)).4 VHLSSs contain rich information on household- and individual-level demographics,
employment, household expenditures, health and other aspects. We use the demographics
and employment modules in this paper. For each VHLSS round, the recall period for ex-
penditures and employment modules is 12-month, meaning that answers to questionnaire
refer to what happens during the most recent 12-month period.5 Whenever suitable, we also
4On top of that, VHLSSs also “serve the evaluation of realization of the Millennium Development Goals
and the Socio-economic Development Goals set out by Vietnamese Government” (see also in The World
Bank (2015)). These surveys are designed and implemented with the technical assistance from UNDP and
the World Bank.
5This detail is important for our subsequent analyses on the impacts of the BTA because the BTA came
to force in December 2001. This means that VHLSS 2001/2002 captures information in the pre-BTA period.
See also McCaig (2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2018).
79
utilize data from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) for 1997/1998, which is a
predecessor of VHLSS.6
Table 2.1 provides main summary statistics of our datasets. In all rounds of VHLSS,
almost 45000 households are interviewed. However, due to current data restrictions from
Vietnam’s GSO, we only have access to samples of about 30000 households for 2001/2002
round and 9000 households for 2011/2012 round. Breaking down by urban-rural criterion,
the fraction of households in urban areas increases over time, from 23% in 2002 to 30% in
2016. Furthermore, the average household size decreases significantly over time, from about
4.5 heads per household in 2002 to 3.8 heads per household in 2016. In terms of individuals
in the sample, the fraction of male and female remains relatively balanced, with the share of
male individuals of about 50% across years. In what follows, we break down further several
demographic characteristics with a particular focus on workers participating in the labor
market drawn from the sample.
2.2.2 Demographic Characteristics of Employed Workers
We restrict our sample of employed workers to individuals with age between 16 and 64, who
are also at the time participating in the labor market. Figure 2.1 illustrates the average age
and education levels of workers stratified by gender and urban/rural status. The top panels
indicate that female workers are on average older than male workers over the sample period.
Furthermore, the average age of employed workers increase substantially, from about 35.2
and 35.6 in 2002 to 39.5 and 40.2 in 2016, respectively for male and female workers. From
the top right panel of Figure 2.1, male workers on average achieve higher education level
than female workers. However, in contrast to age, the average education level increases less,
from about 7.4 and 6.8 in 2002 to 8.3 and 7.8 in 2016, respectively for male and female
workers.
6There are some differences in terms of sample size and level-of-detail in questionnaire between VLSS
and VHLSS. Most notably, VLSSs cover much fewer households (6000 for VLSS 1997/1998). In addition,
the number of household interviewed appears to be biased towards urban/rural areas for many provinces in
the VLSS 1997/1998. See also the Data Appendix and McCaig (2011) for details and some other issues.
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The bottom panels of Figure 2.1 indicate that urban workers are relatively order and more
educated as compared to rural workers. The age structure of urban versus rural workers is
perhaps interesting. Over the sample period from 2002 to 2016, we also observe significant
increases in the average age of employed workers in both urban and rural areas. In addition,
the average age of rural workers appears to catch up with urban workers by 2016. Similar
to the top right panel, we do not see much increase in the average education level of workers
in both urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, the education gap between urban and rural is
large and remains so over the sample period from 2002 to 2016.
2.2.3 Sectoral and Occupational Structures
During the period from 2002 to 2016, there are several significant changes in the structure of
Vietnam’s labor market. In this subsection, we focus the allocation of workers across sectors
and occupations over time.
Table 2.2 illustrates the allocation of workers across broad economic sectors over time.
As shown in Table 2.2, the four dominant sectors of Vietnam’s economy during our sam-
ple period are: Agriculture, Manufacturing, Construction, and Services (combined). This
structure remains relatively stable with the largest change happens in agriculture sector.
In particular, from 2002 to 2016, employment share of agriculture sector decreases 14.98
percentage points, from 59.51% to 44.53%. This decrease in agricultural employment share
is reallocated towards all other sectors, with manufacturing experiencing a 4.37 percentage
points increase in share, up from 11.25% in 2002 to 15.62% in 2016. Construction sector sees
a 2.66 percentage points increase in share while the rest is allocated to service sector. Over-
all, we observe a large movement in share of workers out of agriculture during this sample
period. This resonates with the findings of McCaig and Pavcnik (2013) using Census Data
in 1989, 1999, 2009 and other aggregate data sources. McCaig and Pavcnik (2013) docu-
ment workers moving out of agriculture from 1990 to 2008 as a major structural change in
Vietnam’s labor market and show that this movement has contributed to the high aggregate
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labor productivity growths in Vietnam during this period.
Table 2.3 illustrates the allocation of workers across 10 broad categories of occupation
over time. These broad categories include: (0) Army , (1) Leaders in All Fields and Lev-
els, (2) High-level Professionals in All Fields, (3) Mid-level Professionals in All Fields, (4)
Elementary Professionals (Staff & White-collar Personnel), (5) Skilled Workers in Services,
(6) Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Sylviculture, Aquaculture, (7) Skilled Handicraftsmen &
Other Skilled Manual Workers, (8) Assemblers and Machine Operators, (9) Unskilled Work-
ers. Classification of these 10 broad categories are based on occupation codes recorded in
the VHLSSs. This 1-digit classification is also designed such that it is consistent with the In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) proposed by the International
Labour Organization (International Labour Organization (2012)).7
Table 2.3 shows that Vietnamese economy’s employment during our sample period is
also largely dominated by unskilled occupations. In 2002, more than 75% of workers are
categorized as unskilled. By 2016, this share decreases significantly by 19.31 percentage
points to 56.51%. Nevertheless, unskilled workers still account for more than half of all
employed workers. Over time, unskilled workers are reallocated mainly to jobs including
Mid-level Professionals (3.42 percentage points), Skilled Handicraftsmen & Other Skilled
Manual Workers (4.68 percentage points) and Assemblers and Machine Operators (4.63
percentage points). Large increases are also observed in shares of Skilled Workers in Services
(2.42 percentage points) and Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Sylviculture, Aquaculture (3.01
percentage points). Table 2.3 demonstrates clearly how Vietnam’s occupation structure
evolves over time, moving workers out of unskilled and towards more skilled jobs.
7VHLSSs record occupation codes at a more disaggregate 2-digit level. We observe some concordance
issues at 2-digit level between VHLSS rounds before and after 2010. Therefore, we use 1-digit occupation
level as our main point of reference. Table A4 in the Appendix provides the allocation of workers across
2-digit occupations recorded in VHLSSs.
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2.2.4 Wages and Inequality
Between 2002 and 2016, real annual wages increase from an average of 5.5 million VNDs to
16.8 million VNDs, a three-fold increase.8 Figure 2.2 illustrates the wage disparities between
male and female workers, as well as between urban and rural workers, over our sample period.
The top right panel shows that female workers earn consistently less than male workers
and the gender wage gap appears to enlarge over time in absolute terms. From 2002 to 2016,
male workers’ wages increase from an average of 5.8 million VNDs to 17.8 million VNDs.
For female workers, wages increase from an average of 5.0 million VNDs to 15.4 million
VNDs. As a result, the gender wage gap increases from 0.8 million VNDs to 2.4 million
VNDs in absolute terms. However, in relative terms, male workers get paid 16% higher than
their female counterparts in 2002. This premium decreases slightly to 15.5% in 2016. As
shown in the top left panel, relative gender wage inequality remains mostly unchanged during
this period, reflecting that economic development has not been associated with gender pay
equality in Vietnam.
The bottom right panel shows that urban workers also earn higher wages as compared
to rural workers. From 2002 to 2016, urban workers’ wages increase from an average of 8.9
million VNDs to 20.5 million VNDs. For rural workers, wages increase from an average of
4.0 million VNDs to 14.4 million VNDs. Even though, the urban-rural wage gap appears to
increase in absolute terms, from 4.9 million VNDs in 2002 to 6.1 million VNDs in 2016, such
gap has narrowed down in relative terms. As shown in the bottom left panel, the urban-rural
wage gap has decreased dramatically, from 122.5% to 42% wage premium during this period.
This pattern is consistent with the urban-rural wage convergence in India, but is in contrast
with China’s experience as documented by Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2019).
8Real wages are deflated using Consumer Price Index series from the World Bank. The base year is 2002.
In 2016, Vietnam’s CPI is 302. VND is the acronym for Vietnam Dong.
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2.3 Intergenerational Mobility
To investigate the degree of intergenerational mobility, we narrow our focus to a sample
comprised of sons and fathers within households. Following Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul
(2013) and Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017) for India, we abstract from studying mobility among
female members of households because working-age female members’ labor market outcomes
tend to be correlated with the decision to co-reside with biological parents in Vietnam,
which we cannot control for based on information in the VHLSSs. In contrast, coresident
rate is much higher for adult sons due to Vietnam’s cultural values.9 As mentioned in
section 2.1, we also focus on intergenerational occupational mobility as our main outcome of
interest. As a result, our sample is restricted to son-father pairs in which both members are
contemporarily participating in the labor market. Our final working sample is comprised of
sons aged between 16 and 40 since the majority of working sons in our sample are within
this range. Furthermore, fathers of sons aged above 40 are also more likely to have retired,
which can potentially bias our subsequent analyses.
Our first task is to construct a ranking of occupations. Conceptually, we generally think
of a “good job” as containing a high level of skill intensity. Ideally, we would like a task-based
measure of skill intensity for each occupation, similar to Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)
and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Unfortunately, this information is not readily available
for Vietnam’s occupations. Our baseline measure of skill intensity is therefore based on
information about the average education level of workers within each occupation, similar
to the ranking approach in Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017).10 Specifically, for each 1-digit








9Using a 2011 nationally representative survey dataset of elderly parents of age 60 and above, Teerawi-
chitchainan, Pothisiri and Long (2015) document that 41% of parents live with their adult sons while only
26% of parents live with their adult daughters.
10Since we use occupation codes at 1-digit aggregate level, we do have rankings based on task-based
measures. We present some of these results in the Appendix.
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In equation (2.1), wi and wk are individual i and k’s sample weights in VHLSS 2001/2002
(base year). Edui is grade level completed by individual i. The weighted summation is
performed across all individuals within occupation o.11 Here, we use our full sample of
workers aged between 16 and 64 to compute the education index in equation (2.1) to ensure
the representativeness of the index. Table 2.4 illustrates our education index and ranking
results.
From Table 2.4, the top occupation category is (2) High-level Professionals in All Fields
with an education index of 11.9, meaning almost everyone in this category has a high school
degree. This category includes jobs such as scientists, high-level experts in technical fields
and high-level experts in life and health sciences. As expected, the subsequent categories
are (3) Mid-level and (4) Elementary Professionals with education indices of 11.4 and 11.1
respectively. (1) Leaders in All Fields and Levels has an index of 10.8. The next group
of occupations are (8) Assemblers and Machine Operators, (5) Skilled Workers in Services
and (7) Skilled Handicraftsmen & Other Skilled Manual Workers with education indices
indicating that most workers completed secondary schooling. The final group comprises of
(9) Unskilled Workers and (6) Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Sylviculture, Aquaculture.
Interestingly, the education indices suggest that average education of unskilled workers is
slightly higher than skilled workers in agriculture, which are 6.6 and 6.5 respectively. Since
the majority of unskilled workers in category (9) are in agriculture, we assign the same
bottom rank for these two occupation categories.12 This assignment is consistent with the
notion that mobility out of agriculture provides workers access to better jobs in nonfarm
sectors, which is an important avenue to gain stable income streams and escape poverty
(World Development Report (2006), Emran and Shilpi (2011)).13
11Slightly different from Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017), we have detail information about grade completed
by each individual rather than indicators for degree received in VHLSSs. This will distinguish, for example,
workers who complete grade 8 versus workers who complete grade 5 only. One disadvantage of our data is
that we do not have detail 3-digit level occupation codes as in India’s context.
12See also the employment share of occupation code (92) Unskilled Workers in Agriculture, Forestry and
Aquaculture in Table A4 in the Appendix.
13This assignment is also consistent with a major structural change in Vietnam during our sample period
associated with workers moving out of agriculture sectors as documented in McCaig and Pavcnik (2013).
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Based on our ranking of occupations, we construct an indicator variable of upward oc-
cupational mobility Upwardi. In particular, this indicator equals 1 if son i works in a
higher-ranked occupation than his father and equals 0 otherwise.
Upwardi =

1 if Rank(Son) > Rank(Father)
0 otherwise.
(2.2)
Figure 2.3 illustrates the persistence of upward occupational mobility for all years in our
sample. The top panel shows the distribution of son’s occupation conditioning on being born
to fathers with top occupation (High-level Professionals) while the bottom panel shows the
same distribution conditioning on being born to fathers with bottom occupation (Unskilled
and Agricultural Workers). The top panel suggests that more than 50% of sons being born
to fathers who are high-level professionals also become high-level professionals. On the
other hand, 73% of sons being born to fathers who are unskilled and agricultural workers
also become unskilled and agricultural workers, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.3.
Overall, Figure 2.3 indicates a very high correlation of occupational choice across generations
in the VHLSS sample.
This high level of intergenerational occupational persistence masks important underlying
changes in social mobility over time. Figure 2.4 illustrates the evolution of upward occupa-
tional mobility from 2002 to 2016. In 2002, less than 15% of sons had better jobs than their
fathers. Nonetheless, this fraction has increased consistently. By 2010, about 24% of sons
are able to move up the ranking, and by 2016, this fraction increases to about 32.5%. Figure
2.4 implies that there has been a substantial increase in upward occupational mobility. We
are interested in investigating how much of this increase in mobility can be attributed to the
US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement. In the next sections, we describe the background
of the US-Vietnam BTA in details and explore its implications for intergenerational mobility
in Vietnam during this period.
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2.4 Background on Vietnam’s International Trade
2.4.1 United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA)
The United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) took about five years to ne-
gotiate and entered into force in December 2001.14 The trade agreement was negotiated
following the formal normalization of diplomatic relations between US and Vietnam since
1995. Following the BTA, the most important change on the US side was to grant Normal
Trade Relations(NTR)/Most Favored Nation(MFN) status to Vietnam and allowed Viet-
nam’s exports immediate access to the US market. In exchange, Vietnam made extensive
commitments in terms of changing its laws, regulations and administrative procedures that
comply with international trade norms and standards. However, due to its status as a devel-
oping country, Vietnam’s commitments are “phased-in”, meaning that they are scheduled
for implementation in a number of years following the BTA. Even though, Vietnam also
committed to cut tariffs for 250 out of more than 6, 000 HS-6 US products, the average tariff
reductions are negligible since Vietnam already applied its low MFN tariffs to US before the
BTA.15
Upon being granted NTR/MFN status, Vietnam was moved from the “Column 2” to
“Column 1” (MFN) of the US tariff schedule. Importantly, although the BTA is subjected
to a lengthy negotiation process on both sides, the magnitude of US tariff changes to Vietnam
is largely predetermined and not influenced by either US or Vietnam’s bargaining position.
In particular, the “Column 2” tariffs are the tariffs assigned to nonmarket economies under
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. On the other hand, the MFN tariffs are the tariffs
offered to all WTO members by the US and determined through a multilateral bargaining
process with other countries long before 2001.16 To this extend, the BTA tariff reductions
14The primary sources of information for the description of the BTA in this section are STAR-Vietnam
(2003) and McCaig (2011).
1580% of these 250 tariff concessions was in the agriculture sector.
16Upon China’s accession to WTO in 2001, China also experienced a similar treatment from US, which
is exogenous in US and China’s industries’ perspectives. However, in the case of China, such treatment is
interpreted as a removal of trade policy uncertainty rather than an actual trade policy change. See also
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of U.S to Vietnam are plausibly exogenous to any domestic conditions or political processes
of Vietnam (see also exogeneity arguments in McCaig (2011), Fukase (2013), McCaig and
Pavcnik (2018)).
The BTA tariff reductions are also large in magnitude. Following the BTA, the ad valorem
US tariffs to Vietnam’s products decrease from an average of 23.4% to 2.5%. The decrease
is largest for the manufacturing sector, from an average of 33.8% to 3.6% and is much more
modest for the agriculture and other primary sectors. As we will show next, the BTA was
followed by large and immediate changes in Vietnam’s exports to US.
2.4.2 Vietnam’s Exports to US
We document two most salient features of Vietnam’s exports to U.S during the past two
decades following the BTA: (1) exports has increased substantially and consistently and (2)
export structure swiftly shifts to much higher unit-value products.17
Figure 2.5 illustrates Vietnam’s export value to US from 1996 to 2016. Prior to the BTA,
exports to US was about 1.04 billion US dollars, accounted for only 6.5% of total exports
and 3.2% of GDP in 2001. In 2002, immediately after the BTA came to force, exports to US
grew to 2.6 billion US dollars, a 147% increase. By 2006, annual exports to US amounted
to 9.2 billion US dollars, a nine-fold increase, and accounted for 23% of total exports and
almost 14% of GDP.18 By 2016, Vietnam exported 43.6 billion US dollars to US, which
represented 20% of total exports and almost 21% of GDP.19 Figure 2.5 also shows that the
bulk of increase in Vietnam’s exports to US is manufacturing. Specifically, the share of
manufacturing exports increased from an average of 40% prior to the BTA to around 67%
in 2002 and 87% in 2006 respectively. By 2016, this share was 92%.
A parallel and significant change in Vietnam’s exports to US following the BTA is a
Pierce and Schott (2016) for details.
17All values in this subsection are in nominal term.
18See Figure A4 in the Appendix where we zero in on the changes in period from 1996-2006 and shows a
sharp increase in exports following the BTA.
19By this time, Vietnam was able to diversify its export portfolio with second- and third-largest export
partners being China and Japan respectively.
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sharp increase in average unit value of exports. Figure 2.6 illustrates the average unit value
of Vietnam’s exports to US from 1996 to 2016.20 From 1996 to 2001, the average unit value
almost did not change and remained at around 15 US dollars per unit. In 2002, the average
unit value increased to 33 US dollars per unit, a double increase. Unit value continued to
increase and by 2006, it reached 52 US dollars per unit. The unit value remained about
at the same level for almost ten years and only increased again to about 65 US dollars per
unit since 2012. If unit value partially represents the quality of export products, Figure 2.6
suggests that export quality of Vietnam’s products has increased substantially during this
period. In subsequent empirical analyses, we show that tariff reductions following the BTA
is the key underlying determinant driving the improvements in both Vietnam’s exports and
export quality to US.
2.4.3 WTO Accession in 2007
During the period from 2002 to 2016, Vietnam implemented another major trade reform fol-
lowing its accession to WTO in January 2007. Accession to WTO was a lengthy process and
Vietnam had been preparing for this event by implementing reforms on three major fronts:
(1) administrative procedure, (2) gradual removal of trade barriers, and (3) conformation of
their legal system to international trade law.21 For our purpose, we focus on the removal of
tariffs during Vietnam’s accession to WTO period.
Upon WTO accession, Vietnam immediately cut average tariffs by about 3 percentage
points across all industries. Figure 2.7 illustrates Vietnam’s average applied tariffs from
1998-2016. As shown in Figure 2.7, tariffs had already been cut gradually over time before
WTO accession. From 1998 to 2007, average tariff decreases from 17.3 percentage points
to 13.4 percentage points. In 2008, average tariff dropped sharply another 3 percentage
points and remained at the level of about 9 percentage points since 2013. Decomposing by
20Unit value is a weighted average of unit values at HS 10-digit level, with the weights being the export
values of each product.
21See Pham (2011) for a brief description of these reforms.
89
broad sectors, manufacturing tariffs have always been higher while primary sectors’ tariffs
have always been lower than the average tariffs. This reflects the country’s comparative
advantages and political economy motives in setting the tariffs to protect its manufacturing
sectors while at the same time opening up the primary sectors for competition and access to
intermediate inputs.
There was much expectation about the beneficial prospects at the time of Vietnam’s
WTO accession. Nevertheless, the evidence on such benefits are scant and less conclusive.
Pham (2011) and Vo and Nguyen (2009) are among the few studies that examine the eco-
nomic impacts of Vietnam’s WTO accession. One of the robust findings in both studies is
that Vietnam’s imports and inward foreign direct investments (FDI) appear to increase sub-
stantially due to the accession, although WTO membership did not have any direct impact
on exports. To this end, we control for trade liberalization due to Vietnam’s WTO accession
in our analyses since earlier research such as Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017), Hasan, Mitra
and Ural (2007), Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010) have shown that import liberaliza-
tion can have important impacts on labor market outcomes in general and intergenerational
mobility in particular.
2.5 Impact of BTA on Intergenerational Mobility
A key interest in this paper is to understand how the BTA affected intergenerational mobility
in Vietnam from 2002 to 2016. We first briefly describe how we measure households’ exposure
to trade shocks associated with the BTA in 2001. We then specify our empirical models used
to estimate causal impacts of the BTA exposure on intergenerational mobility.
2.5.1 Measuring the BTA Exposure
We adopt a local labor market approach that widely used in the international trade and labor
market literature. In particular, following Hasan, Mitra and Ural (2007), McCaig (2011),
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Topalova (2010) and Kovak (2013), we exploit provincial variation in the BTA exposure
that arises due to differences in initial industrial structure across provinces. Our measure of
provincial exposure is as follows:
τBTAp = τ
MFN
p − τColumn 2p < 0, (2.3)




p are the provincial




sjp × τXj , (2.4)
where X ∈ {MFN,Column 2} and τXj is the respective US tariff for industry j.22 The share







where wijp and wkmp are individual weights in the VHLSS 2001/2002. In this equation, i, k
index individual and j,m index industry. In economic terms, sjp represents employment
share of industry j within province p at the beginning of our sample period (pre-BTA).23
Similar to Hasan, Mitra and Ural (2007) and Kovak (2013), but different from McCaig
(2011) and Topalova (2010) however, we compute the employment share only within traded
industries (scaled exposure) rather than including the non-traded sectors. This empirical
approach is grounded in theory as suggested by Kovak (2013).24
Figure 2.8 illustrates a map of Vietnam’s provinces/central cities with variation in the
BTA exposure. In the figure, lighter areas faced smaller BTA tariff cuts, while darker areas
22All tariffs are measured as natural log of one plus the actual average ad valorem tariffs.
23As in equation (2.1), we restrict our sample in equation (2.5) to workers aged between 16 and 64 recorded
in the VHLSS 2001/2002.
24Importantly and similar to Kovak (2013), we find that including the non-traded sectors in the BTA
exposure computation magnifies our estimates of the effects and make these estimates more significant. The
results for this approach are available upon request.
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faced larger cuts. Across 63 provinces and central cities, the BTA tariff exposure, measured
as provincial tariff reductions in equation (2.3), range from 5.80 percentage points to 27.58
percentage points.25 The top-4 BTA exposure includes Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Hanoi
(and Ha Tay combined) and Binh Duong. The bottom-4 BTA exposure includes Ca Mau,
Quang Ninh, Ha Giang and Son La. As is clear from the map, the Red River Delta, Central
Coast and Mekong Delta are among the regions that expose the most to the BTA shock.
2.5.2 Empirical Strategy - Baseline
To examine the impact of the BTA on intergenerational occupational mobility, we begin
with a baseline difference-in-difference (DID) model specified as follows:
Upwardipt = θ × PostBTAt × τBTAp + γτV Npt +X ′iptβ + λp + λt + εipt. (2.6)
In equation (2.6), Upwardipt is an upward mobility indicator of son i in province p and
year t, defined as in equation (2.2). PostBTAt is an indicator variable for post-BTA years.
Specifically in our sample, data in the VHLSS 2001/2002 round are treated as pre-BTA while
data in the later VHLSS rounds are considered as post-BTA.26 τV Npt is Vietnam’s tariff of
province p in year t and defined analogously to τBTAp as in equation (2.4).
27 The inclusion
of τV Npt controls for the province-level protection on Vietnam’s side and WTO accession as
mentioned in section 2.4. Xipt is a vector of demographic controls including age, age squared,
father’s age, father’s age squared, marriage status, urban status, minority status, household
size and share of male members within the household. In addition, similar to Emran and
Shilpi (2011) and Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017), we also control for father’s education index
25Prior to 2003, Vietnam has 61 provinces and central cities. From 2003 to 2008, it splits several provinces
into smaller administrative units and increases this number to 64. Since 2008 until now, the number decreases
to 63 due to the merge of Hanoi and Ha Tay. See the Data Appendix for the geographic concordances.
26As mentioned in section 2.2, the recall period of VHLSSs is 12-month. The BTA entered into force in
December 2001. This means that VHLSS 2001/2002 records pre-BTA data. Furthermore, we expect the
effect of the BTA on mobility takes time to realize.
27In particular, τV Npt =
∑
j sjp × τV Njt .
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as a proxy for unobservable genetic traits. Whenever suitable, we also add measures of sons’
educational attainment to control for education channel of mobility. λp and λt are province
and year fixed effects respectively.
From equation (2.6), our identification is obtained by comparing the change in fractions
of sons who have experienced upward mobility across provinces before and after the BTA,
and who are exposed differentially to the BTA shocks due to initial industrial structures of
provinces. Standard errors are clustered at province-year level, which is the level of variation
of the BTA shock. Our main parameter of interest is θ, which captures the average effect of
the BTA on intergenerational occupational mobility.
Table 2.5 presents our baseline model’s results. Column (1) shows the baseline result
without any control. Columns (2) and (3) add the vector of demographic controls and
Vietnam’s tariffs progressively. Column (4) adds education controls. Across columns (1)-(4),
the estimated effects of the BTA are stable and significant. In particular, the magnitude of
the estimates ranges from−0.418 to−0.498. This suggests that a 1 percentage point decrease
in the BTA provincial tariff leads to a 0.418-0.498 point increase in upward occupational
mobility. Taking our preferred estimate in column (3) −0.498 and combining it with the fact
that the average BTA exposure across province is −10.27 points, our baseline result suggests
that the BTA has induced 5.11 percentage points increase in upward occupational mobility.
This accounts for almost one-third of overall increase in mobility during our sample period
from 2002 to 2016.28 This is one of our key results in this paper.
2.5.3 Extended DID Model
Since we have multiple rounds of VHLSS that span over almost two decades and the BTA
occurs in the beginning of our sample period, it is possible to disentangle the short- and
long-term effects of the BTA. To this end, we estimate an extended DID model, specified as






θ1y1{y = t} × τBTAp +
2016∑
y=2002
θ2y1{y = t} × τV Npy (2.7)
+X ′iptβ + λp + λt + εipt.
In equation (2.7), the effect of τBTAp is allowed to vary over time. This heterogeneity is cap-
tured by the interactions between τBTAp and the year indicators 1{y = t}.29 In this extended
DID model, we also control for the WTO accession in a similar manner. In particular, τV Npy
is defined as τV Npy ≡ τV Np,y −τV Np,2006. This approach effectively normalizes tariffs in 2006 to zero
and allows Vietnam’s tariff reductions due to WTO affect mobility differently over time.
Table 2.6 presents our extended model’s results. Column (1) shows the result without
WTO controls. Column (2) shows the effects of WTO without the BTA shocks. Column
(3) includes both BTA and WTO. Across all columns, we include the vector of demographic
controls. From column (1), we observe that the average effect in column (2) of Table 2.5
are decomposed over time. Specifically, the effects of the BTA become larger and more
statistically significant over time (except for 2014). In column (2), WTO accession alone
does not appear to have large and persistent effects on occupational mobility. Only in 2008,
which is one-year after Vietnam’s WTO accession, we see that provinces/central cities more
exposed to WTO accession have higher mobility. This is consistent with the findings of
Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017) that import competition can induce upward mobility.30 In
column (3), we decompose further the effects of the BTA which might be influenced by the
WTO accession. In this column, the effects of the BTA becomes much stronger and more
statistically significant while the effects of WTO accession almost disappear. Figure 2.9
illustrates the column (1) (top) and column (3) (bottom) results from Table 2.6. Overall, a
robust pattern is that the long-term effects of the BTA are larger than the short-term effects,
29The effect of year 2002 is normalized to 0 as our base year in this extended DID framework.
30Nevertheless, in their empirical context, Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017) study the effects 9 year post-
liberalization and they use a cross-sectional variation rather than a DID research design for identification.
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suggesting persistent and long-lasting effects of the BTA on intergenerational occupational
mobility. This is our second key result.
2.6 Mechanism
In this section, we explore potential mechanisms through which the BTA affects intergenera-
tional occupational mobility. We consider two mechanisms. First, since better jobs generally
require higher level of education, we examine whether sons living in the areas with more ex-
posure to the BTA shocks attain more education. Second, as shown in Figures 2.5-2.6 and
discussed in section 2.4, it is possible that BTA-induced improvements in both Vietnam’s
exports and unit-value (proxied for quality) have contributed to the mobility. We show that
these are indeed the case.
2.6.1 Education Channel
To explore the effect of the BTA on educational attainment of sons within households, we first





θ1y1{y = t} × τBTAp +
2016∑
y=2002
θ2y1{y = t} × τV Npy (2.8)
+X ′iptβ + λp + λt + εipt.
In equation (2.8), Eduipt is a measure of education level of son i in province p and year t. The
first three panels of Figure 2.10 illustrate the model results with dependent variables being
indicators for completing primary school, secondary school and high school respectively as
highest educational accomplishment. These results correspond to column (3) of Table 2.6.
From Figure 2.10, sons living in the provinces that expose more to the BTA shocks appear
to be less likely finish only primary or secondary school. The decreases in such likelihood
95
are much stronger for secondary-school completion. On the other hand, sons living in these
areas are more likely to obtain a high-school degree. These results suggest that the BTA
might have induced sons’ human capital investment through education.
To further link sons’ educational attainment to the intergenerational mobility dimension,
we consider a measure of intergenerational educational mobility where mobility is defined as
an indicator for sons having a high-school degree but not their fathers. The last panel of
Figure 2.10 captures the effects of the BTA on educational mobility. As illustrated in this
panel, sons living in areas that expose more to the BTA shocks are more likely completed
high school as compared to their fathers.31 Overall, Figure 2.10 displays a very similar
pattern as compared to Figure 2.9 in that the effects of the BTA seem to be increasingly
strong and persistent over time.
2.6.2 Exports and Unit-Value
Recall that in section 2.5 we have investigated the direct (reduced-form) impact of the
BTA tariff reductions on intergenerational occupational mobility. To see how the BTA
tariff reductions work through improvements in Vietnam’s exports, we first establish the
relationships between the BTA tariff reductions and exports.
We begin by constructing a province-level export index similar to province-level tariffs




sjp × log(Exportjt). (2.9)
In equation (2.9), log(Exportjt) is the natural log of exports to US in industry j and year
t.32 sjp is the employment share of traded industry j within province p drawn from VHLSS
2001/2002 as defined in equation (2.5).
31We also find that the BTA shocks decrease downward educational mobility and increase probability of
both sons and fathers having high-school degree.
32This construction ensures that dEXIpt =
∑
j sjp × dlog(Exportjt)
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Given this province-level export index, we then estimate how the BTA tariff reductions




θ1y1{y = t} × τBTAp + λp + λt + εpt. (2.10)
Notice that equation (2.10) is estimated at province level, and since trade data is available
before 2001, we could estimate this model for years from 1998 to 2016.33 We also control
for province and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered two-way at province
and year level. Our estimation results are shown in columns (1) and (3) of Table A3 in
the Appendix and illustrated in Figure 2.11 . As clearly shown in Figure 2.11, the BTA
has very large effects on provincial export index. Similar to previous findings, effects of the
BTA are increasing and persistent in the long-run. In particular, the effects accumulate from
2002 to 2008 and remain at the same magnitude until 2016. Our estimates suggest that a
1 percentage point decrease in the provincial BTA tariff leads to an average 10.79 points
increase in province’s export index (column 1 of Table A3). As in section 2.5, the average
provincial BTA tariff decreases by −10.27 points. This suggests that the BTA has induce
110.8 percentage point increase in provincial exports to US.
We construct a similar unit-value index for each province, denoted by UV ALpt, and
perform an analogous excercise. In this case, log(Exportjt) in equation (2.9) is replaced
by log(Unitvaluejt) which represents the natural log of (weighted) average unit-value of
industry j in year t. The results for the impact of the BTA tariff reductions on UV ALpt are
shown in columns (2) and (4) of Table A3. We find that the BTA has improved province-level
unit-value index, even though there seems to be a strong pre-trend existing prior to 2001 for
unit-value index.
To investigate whether the BTA has worked through exports overall and unit-value in
33Our choice of initial year 1998 here is due to the fact that this is the first year Vietnam introduces
its own MFN tariff rates, according to Import and Export Duties Law of Vietnam which is substantially
amended in 1998. This choice is also consistent with our VLSS 1997/1998 data.
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particular in affecting upward occupational mobility, we estimate the following model:
Upwardipt = Indexpt +X
′
iptβ + λp + λt + εipt, (2.11)
where Indexpt ∈ {EXIpt, UV ALpt}. The model is first estimated with ordinary least squares
(OLS). Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.7 show the results for export and unit-value index
respectively. Column (1) suggests that a one point increase in export index leads to 0.042
points increase in upward mobility. Similarly, column (3) suggests that a one point increase
in unit-value index leads to 0.033 points increase in upward mobility. Notice that if we
combine the result in column (1) with our results from Table A3, the estimates suggest that
the BTA tariff reductions work entirely through export index i.e. 0.042 × 10.787 = 0.45,
which is almost equals to the (reduced-form) BTA effect estimates in Table 2.5. By the
same token, improvements in unit-value index also appear to be driving the upward mobility.
Combining the result in column (3) with our results from Table A3, the estimates suggest
that the BTA tariff reductions working through upgrading provinces’ unit-value indices lead
to 0.033×15.652 = 0.52 point increase in upward mobility, slightly stronger than the export-
index channel.
It is possible that both EXIpt and UV ALpt might be endogenous in equation (2.11)
since provinces with higher export or unit-value index might have experienced different
changes in upward mobility. To allow for this possibility, we estimate equation (2.11) with an
instrumental variable (IV) approach in which we use the BTA tariff change as an instrument
for either EXIpt and UV ALpt. These results are displayed in columns (2) and (4) of Table
2.7. Our previous findings remain robust with IV estimation.34 Overall, we find that the
BTA reductions have worked through both improving exports overall and export unit-value
in particular (proxied for quality) in strengthening intergenerational occupational mobility.
34The only difference incurs between columns (3) and (4), suggesting that there might be some endogeneity
regarding unit-value index. Also, our IV for UV ALpt is not perfect since it is possible that the BTA tariff
reductions might also affect mobility through other channels such as export quantity. In that case, the
exclusion restriction is violated. A more rigorous approach requires an additional instrument or properly
controlling for export quantity. We leave this for future research.
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This is our last key finding in this paper.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of a large and exogenous export shock on intergenerational
mobility in Vietnam, a small and rapid-developing economy. Our results suggest that export
liberalization induced by United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) has led
to substantial increase in upward occupational mobility, accounting for one-third of overall
increase in mobility in Vietnam during the past two decades. We also find that the BTA
has induced more educational attainment of younger generations and worked through im-
proving exports overall as well as unit-value in particular (proxied for quality) in promoting
intergenerational mobility.
Our findings have several important implications. First and most importantly, our paper
show that trade can breakdown certain frictions and social structures that impede inter-
generational mobility. This leads to more equality of opportunities for younger generations,
which is an important margin often missing in the trade and inequality literature. Second, if
trade can promote mobility and allow high-ability individuals obtaining better jobs, this can
generate additional long-term gains from trade due to more efficient allocation of resources.
There are several caveats to our current analysis, however. First even though, we were
able to measure occupational mobility based on education content of each occupation, which
we used as a proxy for skills, we would prefer a direct skill measure of each occupation as in
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Second, in an attempt
to separately quantify the unit-value channel of the BTA, we have used the same instrument
for both variables: exports and export unit-value. Ideally, we would like an additional
instrument that exogenously shifts export quantity but not unit-value. Finally, although we
have access to household surveys VLSS 1992/1993 and VLSS 1997/1998, we have not been
able to use them for pre-trend checks. We leave these considerations for future research.
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Figure 2.1: Age and Education of Employed Workers by Gender (Top) and Urban/Rural
Status (Bottom)
Note: Sample of employed workers are individuals with age between 15 and 65 who are contem-
porarily participating in the labor market.
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Figure 2.2: (Annual) Real Wages of Employed Workers by Gender (Top) and Urban/Rural
Status (Bottom) in Thousand VNDs
Note: Sample of employed workers are individuals with age between 15 and 65 who are contem-
porarily participating in the labor market. Annual real wages are in thousand VNDs and deflated
by CPI data from the World Bank.
101
Figure 2.3: Persistence of Upward Occupational Mobility: Top Fathers (Top) and Bottom
Fathers (Bottom)
Note: The top panel shows allocation of sons’ occupations conditioning on having top fathers
(High-level Professionals). The bottom panel shows allocation of sons’ occupation conditioning on
having bottom fathers (Unskilled and Agricultural Workers).
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Figure 2.4: Occupational Mobility from 2002 to 2016
Note: Upward occupational mobility is fraction of sons that have better jobs than their fathers in
each year. Similar definitions apply for downward and no mobility. Working sample is restricted
to sons aged between 16 and 40 who are contemporarily participating in the labor market.
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Figure 2.5: Vietnam’s Exports to US from 1996-2016 (in Billion US Dollars)
Note: The graph is based on authors’ calculations. The primary sectors include agriculture and
mining. The data is from US Census. All values are in nominal term.
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Figure 2.6: (Weighted) Average Unit Value (in US Dollars) from 1994-2018
Note: The graph shows the (weighted) average unit-value of Vietnam’s exports to US over time.
Unit value is weighted by export value of each product at HS 10-digit level. The graph is based on
authors’ calculations. The data is from US Census. All values are in nominal term.
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Figure 2.7: Vietnam’s Applied Tariffs to the Rest of the World (in %)
Note: The graph is based on authors’ calculations. The primary sectors include agriculture and
mining. The data is from WITS.
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Figure 2.8: The BTA Exposure across Vietnam’s Provinces and Central Cities
Note: The BTA exposure is measured as the weighted average of tariffs in which the weights
are employment share of each traded industry within each province/central city from the VHLSS
2001/2002 round, following approach in Hasan, Mitra and Ural (2007), Kovak (2013). Employment
share is share of workers aged between 16 and 64 recorded in the VHLSS. Traded industries include
industry codes ranging from 1 to 34 using Vietnam’s industrial classification system (industry codes
40, 74, 92, 93 are excluded). The top-4 BTA exposure include Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Hanoi
(Ha Tay combined) and Binh Duong. The bottom-4 BTA exposure include Ca Mau, Quang Ninh,
Ha Giang and Son La.
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Figure 2.9: Effects of the BTA on Upward Occupational Mobility
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Figure 2.10: Effects of the BTA on (Highest) Educational Attainment and Mobility
109
Figure 2.11: Effects of the BTA on Vietnam’s Exports to US (Province-level Regression)
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Table 2.1: Number of Households and Individuals Sampled by VHLSSs across Years
Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
No. of Households 29,533 45,910 45,945 45,945 46,995 9,399 46,995 46,381
Urban 6,909 11,240 11,520 11,760 13,245 2,703 13,905 13,890
(23%) (24%) (25%) (26%) (28%) (29%) (30%) (30%)
Rural 22,621 34,670 34,425 34,185 33,750 6,696 33,090 32,490
(77%) (76%) (75%) (74%) (72%) (71%) (70%) (70%)
Household Size 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8
No. of Individuals 132,385 202,585 197,135 191,432 185,696 36,655 180,919 175,242
Male 65,535 99,655 96,835 93,965 91,165 18,034 89,089 86,162
(50%) (49%) (49%) (49%) (49%) (49%) (49%) (49%)
Female 66,849 102,930 100,300 97,467 94,531 18,621 91,830 89,079
(50%) (51%) (51%) (51%) (51%) (51%) (51%) (51%)
Note: Data are drawn from eight rounds of VHLSSs from 2001/2002 to 2015/2016. In 2012, the
number of households available is substantially smaller than other rounds due to data restriction
from Vietnam’s GSO. In each round, the recall period for the data is 12-month.
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Table 2.2: Sectoral Structure (in Employment Shares) from 2002-2016
Sector 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 ∆ 2002-2016 (%)
Agriculture, Sylviculture & Aquaculture 59.51 56.13 53.28 51.43 45.25 46.32 45.67 44.53 −14.98
Mining 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.63 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.39 −0.33
Manufacturing 11.25 12.71 13.01 13.43 16.66 15.79 15.35 15.62 +4.37
Electricity, Gas, Water Production & Distribution 0.24 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.42 0.40 +0.16
Construction 4.48 4.93 5.26 5.56 6.55 6.77 6.88 7.14 +2.66
Trading & Repairation of Motor Vehicles & Household Tools 10.18 10.23 11.12 11.04 11.84 11.36 11.71 11.93 +1.75
Hotel & Restaurant 2.77 3.06 3.49 3.52 3.97 3.91 3.92 4.46 +1.69
Transportation & Storage 2.82 3.00 3.20 2.98 2.90 2.81 2.61 3.01 +0.19
Finance 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.59 0.54 0.66 0.64 +0.37
Science & Technology Activities 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 +0.07
Consulting & Business Services 0.43 0.57 0.61 0.77 0.93 0.92 1.01 1.09 +0.66
Education & Training 2.58 2.74 2.95 3.06 3.24 3.29 3.74 3.42 +0.84
Health & Social Relief 0.62 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.72 0.92 +0.30
Cultural & Sport Activities 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.81 0.93 0.89 1.07 1.03 +0.70
Communist Party 1.99 2.45 2.85 2.77 2.92 3.06 3.24 2.95 +0.96
Public & Personal Services 1.12 1.08 1.14 1.75 1.79 1.79 1.86 1.78 +0.66
Housework Services 0.59 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.66 0.56 0.52 −0.07
International Organizations 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Shares are in percentage point. Observations are weighted by the sampling weight.
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Table 2.3: Occupational Structure (in Employment Shares) from 2002-2016
Occupation 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 ∆ 2002-2016 (%)
0. Army 0.41 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.27 −0.14
1. Leaders in All Fields and Levels 1.02 1.24 1.47 1.33 1.11 1.13 1.22 1.17 +0.15
2. High-level Professionals in All Fields 1.83 2.27 2.83 3.61 4.58 5.04 5.50 5.25 +3.42
3. Mid-level Professionals in All Fields 2.86 3.08 3.31 3.41 3.68 3.50 3.31 3.27 +0.41
4. Elementary Professionals (Staff & White-collar Personnel) 1.20 1.47 1.45 1.38 1.77 1.89 2.01 1.93 +0.73
5. Skilled Workers in Services 2.71 2.94 3.65 4.11 4.19 4.61 4.80 5.13 +2.42
6. Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Sylviculture, Aquaculture 3.11 2.05 2.42 3.87 6.08 7.11 7.12 6.12 +3.01
7. Skilled Handicraftsmen & Other Skilled Manual Workers 8.97 9.85 10.96 11.58 12.64 12.97 13.24 13.65 +4.68
8. Assemblers and Machine Operators 2.06 2.29 2.58 3.06 4.85 5.69 5.63 6.69 +4.63
9. Unskilled Workers 75.82 74.50 71.00 67.31 60.78 57.77 56.88 56.51 −19.31
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Shares are in percentage point. Observations are weighted by the sampling weight. Two adjustment are made for VHLSS 2010-
2016. First, for these survey rounds, the occupation code 63 is changed to 92 to be consistent with the definition of low-skilled workers
in agriculture, sylviculture, aquaculture. Second, in occupation code 52, a large fraction of sale staffs is street-based, which is previously
categorized as low-skilled. We assign sale staffs without information on wage as 95 (street-based and sales-related workers). Without
these adjustments, there are abrupt jumps in shares of occupation codes 5 and 6 and a sharp decline in share of occupation code 9 from
2008-2010.
113
Table 2.4: Education Index (EI) and Ranking of Occuaptions
Occupation Education Index Ranking
2. High-level Professionals in All Fields 11.9 1
3. Mid-level Professionals in All Fields 11.4 2
4. Elementary Professionals (Staff & White-collar Personnel) 11.1 3
1. Leaders in All Fields and Levels 10.8 4
8. Assemblers and Machine Operators 9.4 5
5. Skilled Workers in Services 9.0 6
7. Skilled Handicraftsmen & Other Skilled Manual Workers 8.5 7
9. Unskilled Workers 6.6 8
6. Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Sylviculture, Aquaculture 6.5 8
Note: Education indices are computed as in equation (2.1) using VHLSS 2001/2002. (9) Unskilled
Workers and (6) Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Sylviculture, Aquaculture are assigned the same
rank.
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Table 2.5: Baseline DID Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No control BTA BTA and Vietnam Education Controls
BTA Effects (Total) -0.418* -0.474** -0.498** -0.496**
(0.249) (0.224) (0.228) (0.224)
Province VN Tariff (Applied) 0.195 -0.498
(0.551) (0.530)
Age 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.051***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age of Father 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age of Father Squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Urban 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.082***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Minority -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.097***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Percent of Male -0.034** -0.034** -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Household Size -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)








Observations 68,028 68,028 68,028 68,028
R-squared 0.100 0.176 0.176 0.216
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Province-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Extended DID Models
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES BTA BTA BTA and Vietnam
BTA Effects in Year 2004 -0.150 -0.805
(0.271) (0.507)
BTA Effects in Year 2006 -0.230 -0.895*
(0.244) (0.498)
BTA Effects in Year 2008 -0.646*** -1.145**
(0.235) (0.529)
BTA Effects in Year 2010 -0.504* -1.163**
(0.264) (0.507)
BTA Effects in Year 2012 -0.946*** -1.602***
(0.319) (0.535)
BTA Effects in Year 2014 -0.222 -0.886*
(0.310) (0.536)
BTA Effects in Year 2016 -0.872*** -1.586***
(0.280) (0.514)
VN Effects in Year 2002 -1.563 6.363
(1.600) (4.006)
VN Effects in Year 2004 0.103 1.261
(1.676) (1.895)
VN Effects in Year 2008 -2.719*** -2.044
(0.942) (1.950)
VN Effects in Year 2010 0.853 0.284
(1.162) (1.224)
VN Effects in Year 2012 2.226 1.589
(1.731) (1.622)
VN Effects in Year 2014 0.585 -0.009
(1.685) (1.732)
VN Effects in Year 2016 0.162 0.842
(1.120) (1.298)
Observations 68,028 68,028 68,028
R-squared 0.176 0.176 0.176
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Province-Year Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Impact of Exports and Unit-Value on Upward Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Export Index (EXI) 0.042*** 0.044**
(0.014) (0.019)
Unit-value Index (UVAL) 0.033*** 0.043**
(0.012) (0.019)
Observations 68,028 68,028 68,028 68,028
R-squared 0.176 0.085 0.176 0.085
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Province-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses





There are three main issues with the VLSS 1997/1998. First, as mentioned in section 2.2,
the number of households interviewed is much smaller in the VLSS as compared to VHLSSs.
In 1997/1998, there are only 6000 households in the sample. Second, even though the VLSS
is presumed to be representative for living standards of the population, the sampling design
is different from VHLSSs. In particular, the sample is designed to be representative for
the rural areas of seven geographic regions at that time (Northern Mountains, Red River
Delta, North Central, Central Coast, Central Highlands, Southeast, Mekong Delta) and
three categories of urban domains (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, other cities, other urban
areas).35 As a result, for 24 out of 59 provinces/central cites, there is no urban household
interviewed. This in turn also leads to oversampling of urban areas without using proper
sampling weights. Finally, two province codes 207 (Bac Kan) and 301 (Lai Chau) are missing
in the VLSS 1997/1998.36
35In later geographic classifications, Northern Mountains is subdivided into Northwest and Northeast,
making up a total of eight geographic regions.
36In 1996, Bac Kan (207) and Thai Nguyen (215) were created by splitting Bac Thai. It appears that
code 207 in VLSS 1997/1998 is actually 215 based on VLSS 1993’s classification.
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Figure A4: Vietnam’s Exports to US from 1996-2006 (in Billion US Dollars)
Note: The graph is based on authors’ calculations. The primary sectors include agriculture and
mining. The data is from US Census. All values are in nominal term.
2.B Additional Figures and Tables
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Table A3: Impact of the BTA on Exports (Province-level Regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports Unit-value Exports Unit-value
BTA Effects (Total) -10.787*** -15.652***
(0.813) (1.560)
BTA Effects in Year 1998 0.011 4.189***
(0.708) (0.938)
BTA Effects in Year 1999 1.613*** 6.799***
(0.477) (1.055)
BTA Effects in Year 2000 0.048 6.109***
(0.342) (0.955)
BTA Effects in Year 2002 -1.130** -2.305***
(0.464) (0.563)
BTA Effects in Year 2003 -7.319*** -8.771***
(0.563) (0.802)
BTA Effects in Year 2004 -9.939*** -12.075***
(0.435) (0.585)
BTA Effects in Year 2005 -9.635*** -11.446***
(0.185) (0.286)
BTA Effects in Year 2006 -11.443*** -13.414***
(0.631) (0.288)
BTA Effects in Year 2007 -11.563*** -14.354***
(0.235) (0.304)
BTA Effects in Year 2008 -11.525*** -13.458***
(0.296) (0.336)
BTA Effects in Year 2009 -12.409*** -12.086***
(0.356) (0.368)
BTA Effects in Year 2010 -12.229*** -12.891***
(0.247) (0.248)
BTA Effects in Year 2011 -11.320*** -12.241***
(0.376) (0.387)
BTA Effects in Year 2012 -10.714*** -10.840***
(0.361) (0.280)
BTA Effects in Year 2013 -11.062*** -11.575***
(0.475) (0.445)
BTA Effects in Year 2014 -11.426*** -11.176***
(0.630) (0.634)
BTA Effects in Year 2015 -11.437*** -11.338***
(0.751) (0.749)
BTA Effects in Year 2016 -12.388*** -12.694***
(0.875) (0.967)
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140
R-squared 0.982 0.952 0.989 0.966
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4: Allocation of Workers across 2-digit Occupations by Year
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Total
0 0.41 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.32
11 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
14 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
15 0.40 0.55 0.69 0.61 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.41
16 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.24
17 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
18 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.06
19 0.23 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.38
21 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.49 0.65 0.75 0.77 0.65 0.52
22 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.21
23 0.74 0.87 1.00 1.21 1.44 1.61 1.80 1.57 1.25
24 0.68 0.91 1.25 1.70 1.68 1.87 2.13 2.14 1.52
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.09
26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.19
31 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.45 0.52 0.45 0.34 0.32
32 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.43 0.50 0.50
33 1.59 1.53 1.52 1.36 1.08 0.99 0.77 0.89 1.25
34 0.70 0.85 1.01 1.27 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.36 0.67
35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.05
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.17 1.04 1.14 1.06 0.52
41 0.77 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.72
42 0.43 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.39
43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.17
44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.72 0.86 0.72 0.33
51 0.87 1.01 1.14 1.68 1.62 1.90 1.87 1.94 1.49
52 1.84 1.93 2.50 2.43 1.41 1.60 1.69 1.90 1.93
53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.22 0.29 0.35 0.14
54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.42
61 3.11 2.05 2.42 3.87 5.41 6.42 6.26 5.23 4.24
62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.70 0.87 0.89 0.36
71 1.73 1.89 2.41 2.89 3.62 3.89 4.01 4.20 3.05
72 1.13 1.30 1.54 1.59 1.63 1.69 1.78 1.83 1.55
73 0.52 0.76 0.68 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.52 0.68 0.65
74 4.55 4.67 5.16 5.13 0.75 0.70 0.78 0.78 2.92
75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.03 6.03 6.15 6.15 2.89
79 1.04 1.23 1.17 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63
81 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.34 2.06 2.86 2.85 3.40 1.48
82 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.74 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.46
83 1.39 1.54 1.80 1.99 2.50 2.51 2.42 2.82 2.13
91 11.20 11.14 11.72 12.12 0.76 1.05 0.82 0.82 6.48
92 55.63 53.74 50.62 47.19 41.92 40.41 38.77 38.41 46.14
93 8.98 9.62 8.65 8.00 5.71 4.98 5.22 4.95 7.08
94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.13
95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.16 10.29 10.75 11.05 5.16
96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.83 1.08 0.97 0.44
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Chapter 3
The Dynamic and Non-Neutral
Productivity Effects of Foreign
Ownership: A Nonparametric
Approach
(joint work with Mary E. Lovely and Yoonseok Lee)
3.1 Introduction
The impact of foreign ownership and foreign acquisitions on domestic firms’ performance
has long been a central topic in empirical studies of globalization (see for example Aitken
and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004), Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2007)). Contemporary
increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic manufacturing productivity, espe-
cially in China, have kept alive debate concerning causal links between these two observed
phenomena.1 Although voluminous, empirical work examining the relationship has focused
1For example, Oberfield and Raval (2014) and Lawrence (2015) identify biased technological change as
a major factor in the secular decline of labor share in the US. Evidence of biased technological change is
also documented by Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2018) using panel data of Spanish manufacturing plants.
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mainly on short-term and Hicks-neutral effects of foreign investment on the production pro-
cesses of domestic firms. In this paper, we study two novel productivity effects of foreign
ownership and foreign acquisition on domestic firms’ production function: the dynamic and
the non-(Hicks)-neutral effects. The former captures the long-term gain or loss from for-
eign ownership, while the latter provides insight into the labor market impact of FDI-led
manufacturing growth. Our empirical context is China’s high-tech manufacturing sectors
from 1998-2007 and we allow for differential effects of foreign investment across investment
sources.
Dynamic productivity effects of foreign ownership arise because adoption of foreign tech-
nology and management practices often takes time to fully realize. To fix ideas, consider a
domestic firm that is acquired by a foreign partner with advanced technological capability.
Absorption of this technology by the acquired firm requires structural transformation in both
production and non-production processes. As time is needed for this adjustment, changes
in measured performance may not be fully realized immediately after the acquisition, but
instead accumulate gradually over a longer time horizon. Accounting for this dynamic ad-
justment provides a more comprehensive picture of how foreign investment affects domestic
firm productivity.
Furthermore, since non-(Hicks)-neutral gains accrue from advanced production technolo-
gies deployed in developed countries, as they are often found to be capital or labor augment-
ing, the same technology may have similar effects in developing economies when transferred
through foreign investment. Biased technological change is considered a leading cause of
many structural transformations in the labor markets of developed countries (Acemoglu
and Autor (2011)). If foreign investment carries advanced foreign technology content, such
investment acts as a firm-level technological shock that alters the production function of
recipient domestic firms, with potentially aggregate implications for the host country.
In this paper, we propose a unifying econometric framework to estimate both the dynamic
More broadly, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) document a global trend of declining labor share, not only
in developed countries but also in developing countries.
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and non-(Hicks)-neutral productivity effects of firm-level foreign investment. To achieve
these goals, we first endogenize the Markov productivity process with regards to the choice of
foreign ownership to recover the productivity dynamic path of firms post-foreign acquisition.
Our dynamic model accounts for the time firms need to adjust to a major ownership change.
Secondly, we estimate a nonparametric production function, treating foreign ownership as
an input choice. This allows us to identify the non-linear effects of foreign investment on
firms’ production function, permitting us to test for non-(Hicks)-neutral productivity effects.
Our econometric framework uses and extends a recent nonparametric identification result for
production function estimation proposed by Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017) (henceforth,
GNR). The GNR method is distinguished from other existing methods, such as Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015), in that
its identification is grounded in economic theory rather than in functional-form assumptions,
enabling us to explore the full impact on production functions due to foreign ownership.
We apply our framework to a panel dataset of Chinese high-tech manufacturing firms
from 1998-2007. During this period, along with other major reforms including state enter-
prise restructuring and its 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, China experi-
enced annual inflows of over $40 billion in foreign investment, almost all in manufacturing
industries.2 Contemporaneously, China’s manufacturing sectors sustained high rates of pro-
ductivity growth (Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012)). This provides an ideal context
to investigate the impacts of foreign investment on Chinese firms’ productivity.
Our analysis focuses on high-tech manufacturing because these are sectors where foreign
partners likely have a technological advantage over Chinese domestic firms. We also fur-
ther explore the differential impacts of foreign investment based on origin: investment from
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth, OECD) member
countries versus that from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (henceforth, HKMT). This em-
pirical interest is motivated by recent empirical evidence (e.g. Kamal (2015)) that HKMT
2Value obtained from Naughton (2006), Figure 17.1. During this time period, foreign direct investment
inflows averaged between 3 and 4 percent of Chinese GDP.
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firms are not more productive than private domestic Chinese firms. Indeed, an unknown
share of HKMT firms are actually mainland Chinese firms that establish headquarters in
a neighboring locations to enjoy favorable tax treatment reserved for foreign investors (Du,
Harrison and Jefferson (2012)). Our analysis supports past findings that HKMT investment
has a lesser effect on productivity and we are also able to compare the dynamics of these
impacts rather than the Hicks-neutral productivity term alone.
We offer three main results. First, in our baseline model, we show that foreign acquisition
of a Chinese private firm improves the target firm’s productivity in both the short and long
run. However, we find that the long-run effect is typically smaller than the short-run effect.
Furthermore, the long-run productivity effect varies significantly across firm sizes: larger
firms generally benefit from foreign ownership while smaller firms do not. Secondly, when we
distinguish foreign investment coming from HKMT versus OECD-member states, we find no
productivity premium relative to domestic ownership from HKMT acquisition, but a larger
than average premium from OECD firm ownership. Interestingly, the production technology
of HKMT-acquired firms are remarkably similar to those of private domestic firms. Finally,
and importantly, we find strong evidence of non-(Hicks)-neutral impacts of OECD ownership
on China’s high-tech manufacturing sectors. We find that foreign technology embedded in
OECD investment has both labor- and capital-augmenting implications.
3.1.1 Foreign Ownership and Productivity Literature
The relationship between foreign ownership and firms’ productivity has been studied exten-
sively in the literature. In most cases, researchers are interested in the short-term and Hicks-
neutral productivity effects, and empirical results are mixed. For example, Djankov and
Hoekman (2000), Harris (2002), Harris and Robinson (2003), Conyon et al. (2002), Girma
and Gorg (2007), Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Girma et al. (2015) find that foreign-invested
firms (and foreign affiliates) have higher productivity than do their domestic counterparts.
In the case of foreign acquisition, foreign investment is found to boost the productivity of
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domestic recipient firms. In constrast, other studies such as Griffith (1999), Benfratello
and Sembenelli (2006), Fons-Rosen et al. (2013), Wang and Wang (2015) find that foreign
ownership typically has no or a very small positive productivity effect post acquisitions.
This paper introduces a new econometric framework for exploring the productivity im-
pacts of foreign acquisition, a contribution made evident by a brief review of prior empirical
approaches. The most common empirical strategy in recent studies is a two-stage approach
where in the first stage the researcher estimates a structural measure of firms’ performance
(i.e. total factor productivity (TFP)), while in the second stage the researcher combines
a difference-in-difference estimator with propensity score matching to identify an average
treatment effect of foreign ownership on firms’ performance. For instance, Arnold and Ja-
vorcik (2009) employ this strategy and find that foreign investment substantially improve
productivity of recipient plants in Indonesia, with an average effect of about 13.5% three
years after acquisition. Wang and Wang (2015) implement this strategy to study the effect
of foreign acquisition compared to domestic acquisition, finding no significant productivity
advantage due to foreign equity participation. Girma and Gorg (2007) and Girma et al.
(2015) apply the same strategy to UK and Chinese manufacturing, respectively, and arrive
at similar qualitative conclusions. Most recently, Javorcik and Poelhekke (2017) employ this
difference-in-difference approach in the context of foreign divestment in Indonesian manufac-
turing, finding support for the hypothesis that the benefits of foreign ownership are driven
by continuous supply of headquarter services. There are two common underlying assump-
tions of these studies: (1) the productivity process is exogenous with regards to the choice of
foreign ownership in the first-stage, and (2) the effect of foreign ownership is Hicks-neutral,
meaning that it only affects the production function in a linear manner. In contrast, our
econometric model relaxes these assumptions and allows the exploration of differences that
are not feasible with previous empirical strategies.
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3.1.2 Our Approach
Our econometric framework builds on a dynamic model of firm behavior introduced in the
productivity estimation literature. This model and its structural estimation have been
developed by a series of papers including Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) (henceforth, OP, LP and ACF, respectively) and
Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017). Our initial points of departure are papers by De Loecker
(2013) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013), who extend productivity analysis to explore
learning-by-exporting and R&D, respectively.3 Most closely related to our paper is Chen
et al. (2017) who extend GNR’s nonparametric framework to study productivity dynamics
of privatization in China. We follow their approach in the context of foreign investment.
Both the ACF and GNR methods draw insights from OP and LP in that the levels of static
inputs are determined based on firms’ current realization of productivity and hence, contain
information about this unobserved characteristic. These observed static inputs can then be
used to nonparametrically control for productivity. ACF combines this information with a
Leontief functional-form assumption to identify the production function.
GNR extracts information from static inputs taking a somewhat different angle. In ad-
dition to using the levels of static inputs to control for productivity, GNR exploits static
input shares and first order conditions to provide additional sources of information for iden-
tification. Additionally, GNR overcomes the non-parametric non-identification issue of the
classic OP and LP methods and allows for more flexible extensions of the model.4
The empirical framework we use in this paper is based on GNR, since it estimates a
gross output production function and allows for flexible nonlinearities in both production
technology and productivity growth. Thus, the GNR method serves our purpose by making
estimation of the dynamic and non-Hicks-neutral effects feasible. Our identification is ob-
3These extensions date back to Griliches (1979)’s knowledge capital model in the productivity literature.
4See also reviews of this non-identification issue provided by Bond and Söderbom (2005), Ackerberg,
Caves and Frazer (2015), Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017).
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tained by the firm’s first-order conditions and timing assumptions.5 In this paper, we do not
distinquish between revenue productivity (TFPR) and physical productivity (TFP) as we
are interested in the general performance of firms, which might include firm-specific market
power as well.6
Our approach offers several advantages. First, by endogenizing the choice of foreign
ownership and allowing this choice to affect future productivity through a Markov process, we
explicitly recover the productivity adjustment path of firms. This allows us to compare short-
term versus long-term effects of foreign ownership and foreign acquisitions. Secondly, by
estimating a nonparametric production function, we can account for the full heterogeneity of
the production function. This feature is particularly important since even within a narrowly
defined industry, firms with different ownership types and different scales of production may
exhibit substantial heterogeneity in production technology. Finally, our framework is easily
extendable to study other dimensions of ownership changes such as distinguishing between
source countries of foreign investment (OCED versus HKMT).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the institutional
background of foreign investment in China’s manufacturing sectors from 1998-2007. In sec-
tion 3.3, we propose our empirical approach and estimation strategy. Section 3.4 details
our dataset. Section 3.5 presents and discusses our results, while section 3.6 draws broader
implications for our research.
3.2 Foreign Investment in China from 1998-2007
Table 3.1 shows aggregate shares of firm and employment by ownership type in 1998 and
2007. Two clear trends can be seen from this table. The first trend is the rapid growth in
China’s private sector. In addition to robust entry of new firms, the Chinese government
5The ACF method is more appropriate in the context where a researcher believes that the gross output
production function is of Leontief form. See Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) for a more detailed discussion
of their approach.
6For a survey regarding the distinction between TFPR and TFP, see Loecker and Goldberg (2014). In
this paper, we use the term “productivity” to refer to firms’ performance.
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pursued a substantial program of SOE reform, the implications of which are studied by
Chen et al. (2017). The second trend is a sharp increase in foreign investment in China’s
manufacturing sectors during this period, with the number of HKMT-owned firms almost
doubling while those with OECD investors tripling in number. The employment share of
foreign-invested firms increases markedly from 6.7% to 13% for HKMT firms and from 5% to
15% for OECD firms between 1998 and 2007. Taken together, the table has two important
implications. First, the number of foreign firms grows proportionally to the total number of
firms in China’s manufacturing during this sample period. In addition, the scale of foreign
firms is larger than that of average domestic firms. In 2007, foreign activities, measured
by employment shares, account for almost 30% of Chinese manufacturing, highlighting their
importance in Chinese manufacturing sector during the sample period. Therefore, at the face
value, understanding the impact of foreign investment on productivity is of great importance
in the China context.
The increase in economic activity of foreign firms reveals much more interesting patterns
in particular sectors. Figure 3.1 captures employment share of HKMT firms and OECD firms
in high-tech industries (henceforth, Tech). We define the Tech group to include industries
that involve relatively more sophisticated production processes. This group of industries in-
cludes 2-digit manufacturing of: general-purpose machinery (35), special-purpose machinery
(36), transportation equipments (37), electrical machinery (39), communication equipment
and computers (40) and precision instruments (41). In the Tech group, the share of foreign
employment increases markedly from about 7% to 16% for HKMT firms and from about
8% to 25% for OECD firms. Again, if one were to combine HKMT and OCED firms into
one category, the pattern of this increase is much steeper and consequently by 2007, foreign
employment accounts for about 40% of the Tech industries. Another interesting pattern
captured by Figure 3.1 is that there is an abrupt surge in the employment share of OECD
firms after 2003. This surge is potentially due to a major overhaul of China’s FDI policy in
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2002 following China’s WTO accession that gave preferences to the high-tech sectors.7
3.3 The Model
We first start with an augmented model of a nonparametric production function. Consider
the following production function:
yit = f(kit, lit,mit, vit) + ωit + εit, (3.1)
where yit, kit, lit,mit are the natural log of output (revenue), capital, labor, and material
of firm i in year t. vit is an indicator variable indicating the ownership status of the firm,
whether domestic (D) or foreign (F):
vit =

1 if Foreign (F)
0 if Domestic (D).
(3.2)
ωit measures productivity of the firm. As briefly mentioned before, we interpret this term as
firm’s performance rather than physical productivity in order to avoid the need to identify
firm markups, which is difficult in Chinese firm-level data due to the lack of firm-level price
information. εit is a random measurement error and fully exogenous. In this model, the
indicator variable vit captures fundamentally different technology (heterogeneity) between
foreign firms (F) and domestic firms (D). We treat this vit as an input into the production
processes of firms and allow it to be correlated with productivity ωit.
The second extended feature of this model is the Markov productivity process. Specifi-
cally, we consider the Markovian productivity:
ωit = h(ωi,t−1, dit) + ηit, (3.3)
7See Lu, Tao and Zhu (2017) for a review of FDI policy in China.
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where dit indicates if the firm switches ownership status between domestic to foreign from
period (t − 1) to period t. If the firm indeed switches in period t, this indicator variable
equals 1. If otherwise (i.e. ownership status does not change), this indicator equals 0. In
particular, dit is defined as:
dit =

1 if vi,t−1 = 0 and vit = 1
0 otherwise .
(3.4)
The function h(.), which captures the expected productivity of the firm at the beginning of
period t, is allowed to be nonparametric.
The structures in (3.1)-(3.4) combined allow us to capture the short-run and long-run
effects on productivity of firms due to foreign ownership. Here, we interpret vit as capturing
the permanent shift in productivity trajectory between domestic and foreign firms. On
the other hand, dit captures the initial difference or selection effect of firms who switch as
compared to firms who do not, conditioning on the same past productivity ωi,t−1. As will be
clear later, if the Markov process h(.) is stationary, the initial difference or selection effect
will die out over time.
Next, we follow the productivity literature in imposing the scalar unobservability as-
sumption:
mit = M(kit, lit, vit, ωit), (3.5)
where M(.) is strictly monotone in ωt, conditioning on all other inputs and state variables.
Intuitively, equation (3.5) implies that more productive firms use more material inputs to
produce more output, conditioning on the same market environments and on all other inputs
as well as state variables such as ownership status.8 A direct result from this assumption is
that function M(.) can be inverted to nonparametrically control for productivity based on
8This assumption can be shown to hold under various market structures. See also expositions of this




ωit = M−1(kit, lit, vit,mit). (3.6)
We also need the timing assumptions in order to identify our production function. The
formal timing assumptions follow GNR and Chen et al. (2017). We describe the timing of
firm’s actions as:
• At the end of period (t− 1), the firm chooses (kit, lit, vit) and whether to exit at t.
• At the beginning of period t, ηit (and hence ωit) realizes. The firm observes their
productivity for period t.
• The firm optimally chooses mit, after which εit realizes and completely determines yit.
• At the end of period t, the firm chooses (ki,t+1, li,t+1, vi,t+1) and whether to exit at
(t+ 1), repeating the same process.
Based on this timing structure, we have classified inputs based on their information
sets. Specifically, we first assume that kit, lit and vit are dynamic inputs that belong to
the information set of the firm at the end of period (t− 1), which we denote by Ii,t−1. This
assumption creates exclusion restrictions between these dynamic inputs and the productivity
shock ηit as well as the random measurement error εit. On top of that, we also assume that
mit is a static input that belongs to the information set in period t, which we denote by Iit,
but not Ii,t−1. This means that mit is allowed to be correlated with ηit. However, since mit is
not correlated with the random measurement error εit by construction, this creates another
exclusion restriction for us to identify the elasticity with respect to this input. Intuitively,
capital and labor are assumed to be sticky inputs: they take time to plan, implement and
go into actual production. On the other hand, firms are assumed to have full flexibility in
adjusting material inputs corresponding to their temporal productivity shocks.
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3.3.1 Dynamic Interpretation
It is important to clarify how we interpret the dynamics in our augmented model. Here,
we follow the literature on dynamic transitions. As mentioned before, the term vit captures
the long-run difference or heterogeneity in production technology between foreign versus
domestic firms. In other words, this long-run difference can be interpreted as the long-run
productivity effect for firms that switch ownership from being purely domestic to having
foreign equity participation (i.e a permanent difference between two equilibrium stages). On
the other hand, the term dit captures the initial gap in productivity between firms who
switch ownership status versus firms who do not. This gap helps us to see whether firms
who switch have systematically different productivity in period t as compared to firms who
do not, conditioning on the same past productivity in period (t − 1). In other words, this
dit term captures any positive or negative selection associated with firms who switch their
foreign ownership status.
As a result of the combined structure from (3.1)-(3.4), the immediate effect on firms
switching ownership status is reflected by the total effect of vit and dit. Figure 3.2 sketches
out three possible dynamic transition scenarios, where switching firms experience different
productivity adjustment paths with regards to immediate versus long-run effects. Depending
on the sign of the initial gap captured by dit, the immediate effect can be smaller than, equal
to, or larger than the long-run effect.
In economic terms, a difference between the immediate and the long-run effects has im-
portant implications. Take, for example, the case where dit is positive. The positive effect of
dit implies a positive selection of firms who switch ownership status from domestic to foreign.
The contribution of this selection reduces over time and converges to a smaller long-run dif-
ference in productivity between domestic and foreign firms. The underlying intuition of this
scenario is that firms who switch ownership status are expected to be more productive in
period (t+1) to begin with, even under the counterfactual situation where foreign acquisition
does not occur. However, in the long run, this initial advantage disappears, domestic firms
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catch up, and the true productivity difference between the two forms of ownership converges
to a smaller level. Similar economic interpretations can be applied in the cases where dit =
0 or dit is negative.
Due to the nature of the nonparametric method, we are able to obtain the whole distribu-
tion of the effect after estimating the model. Nonetheless, in order to aid our interpretation,
in all of our specifications, we maintain the nonparametric specification for the production
function f(.) but simplify the Markov productivity process to be a linear AR(1) process,
which is a widely used specification in the productivity literature. Specifically, we assume
that h(.) is of the following form:
ωit = ρωi,t−1 + γdit + ηit. (3.7)
In the Appendix, we provide analytical formulas for short- and long-run effects of interest
when both the production function and the Markov process are assumed to be linear.
3.3.2 Non-(Hicks)-neutral Effects
We now distinguish between Hicks-neutral and non-(Hicks)-neutral effects in our econometric
model. In our framework, the effect of foreign ownership is Hicks-neutral if and only if the
production function in equation (3.1) can be rewritten in the following form:
yit = f(kit, lit,mit) + g(vit) + ωit + εit. (3.8)
In econometric terms, the productivity effect of foreign ownership is Hicks-neutral if and only
if production function f(.) is additively separable between the typical inputs kit, lit,mit and
the ownership indicator vit. An implication of the specification in equation (3.8) is that the







of ownership, vit. Importantly, since the specification in equation (3.8) is nested within our
nonparametric model in equation (3.1), we can test for nonlinearities in the effects of vit by
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comparing our estimated elasticities under two counterfactual scenarios: when vit = 1 versus
when vit = 0.
9
As an example, Figure 3.3 illustrates the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS)
between labor (L) and material (M) under two counterfactual scenarios: vit = 1 verus vit = 0.
In this figure, when a firm has foreign ownership (vit = 1), MRTS is larger as compared to the
case where the same firm is domestically owned, conditioning on the same amount of labor







). In this case, foreign ownership has labor-augmenting
technology implication and effectively reduces labor share in the production function. Similar
arguments and illustrations apply for the case of capital-augmenting technology.
3.3.3 Estimation Method
We follow closely the nonparametric estimation procedure in Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers
(2017). GNR involves a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the partial
derivative of f(.) with respect tomt.
10 In the second stage, this partial derivative is integrated
up and combined with the Markov process to fully recover the production function.
The first stage of the GNR procedure makes use of the first order condition (FOC). The
firm maximizes its profit with respect to material inputs conditional on the firm’s information
set in period t:11
max
Mt
Pt × E[F (kt, lt,mt, vt)× e(ωt+εt)|It]− ptMt. (3.9)




F (kt, lt,mt, vt)e
ωtE[eεt ]− pt = 0. (3.10)
9Furthermore, we can in principle compute the labor share, capital share and material share in a counter-
factual exercise where we remove all the foreign investment in China’s manufacturing in our sample period.
10In this subsection, the firm index i is omitted for brevity.
11An underlying assumption here is that firms take output and material prices as given conditional on It.
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= logE[eεt ] + log
∂
∂mt
f(kt, lt,mt, vt)− εt. (3.11)
We approximate the unknown partial derivative by polynomial sieves and implement a
nonlinear least square (NLS) estimation procedure to separately identify the partial deriva-
tive ∂
∂mt
f(kt, lt,mt, vt) (elasticity of output w.r.t material) and the random measurement
error εt in the first stage. After identifying this slope, we integrate it up to identify the
production function f(.) up to a constant C(.) as a function of kt, lt, vt, which is denoted
by Dε(kt, lt,mt, vt). This function C(.) reflects the variation of output conditioning on the




f(kt, lt,mt, vt)dmt = f(kt, lt,mt, vt) + C(kt, lt, vt) ≡ Dε(.) (3.12)
Replacing f(.) with its original form in equation (3.1), we compute the term Ψt, defined as:
Ψt ≡ −C(kt, lt, vt) + yt − εt − f(kt, lt,mt, vt)
= −C(kt, lt, vt) + ωt
(3.13)
Now, rewriting the Markov process and making use of the exclusion restrictions described
before, the following equation is nonparametrically identified:
Ψt =− C(kt, lt, vt) + h(ωt−1, dt) + ηt
=− C(kt, lt, vt) + h(Ψt−1 + C(kt−1, lt−1, vt−1), dt) + ηt
(3.14)
Since the Markov process is assumed to be a linear AR(1) process in our empirical imple-
mentations, equation (3.14) can be rewritten as:
Ψt = −C(kt, lt, vt) + ρΨt−1 + ρC(kt−1, lt−1, vt−1) + γdt + ηt (3.15)
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We estimate equation (3.15) with a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure,














This second-stage concludes our estimation implementation. One subtle point of this
nonparametric model is that interpretation of the results is based on the actual parameteri-
zation using polynomial sieves. In each implementation, we approximate the nonparametric
functions with second order polynomials, similar to the translog production function family.
Our results are similar when we use higher-order approximations.
3.4 Data
Our data are drawn from the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE) in China from
1998 to 2007. This is a panel survey data covering all industrial firms with sales above 5
million Renminbi (RMB). The survey encompasses more than 90% of industrial activities in
China. Table A5 in the Appendix summarizes aggregate statistics of this panel dataset by
year, which matches the official published data from the Chinese government and ensures
the quality of our dataset. We follow Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) and Brandt,
Biesebroeck and Zhang (2014) in basic cleaning procedures and in constructing our capital
stock series using the perpetual inventory method. Foreign ownership definitions are based
on the official registration types recorded in the dataset. The official threshold of foreign
12In the actual estimation, we use more moment conditions than required to estimate our model. The
extra moment conditions that makes use of information set in period (t− 1) helps the model to stabilize and
converges faster.
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capital share to be categorized as foreign ownership is 25%. In our dataset however, 75% of
foreign firms have a foreign capital share above 30%.
As previously mentioned, our empirical applications focus on the designated high-tech
industries in China. Therefore, we keep only a sample of six 2-digit industries, including:
general-purpose machinery (35), special-purpose machinery (36), transportation equipment
(37), electrical machinery (39), communication equipment and computers (40) and precision
instruments (41). Since we are mainly interested in comparing foreign firms with private
domestic firms, we drop all firm-year observations that are registered as state-owned enter-
prises (SOE).13 We drop all firms that switch their ownership status more than one time in
the panel. Outliers in terms of capital, labor, material and material share are also excluded
from our sample. These procedures leave us with 126, 397 panels spanning the 10-year pe-
riod. Roughly 25% of total firm-year observations are registered as foreign firms and 75%
are registered as domestic firms. During our sample period, a total of 2, 017 firms switch
ownership status from domestic to foreign, in which 988 firms switch to HKMT-type and
1, 029 firms switch to OECD-type. Overall, the number of switchers is small relative to the
whole sample size, yet it is enough to identify the dynamic effects of a change in foreign
ownership status on productivity.
3.5 Results
In the baseline specification, we combine HKMT and OCED firms and treat them as having
a common technology. Figure 3.4 describes the relationship between the mean predicted
f̂(.) and particular inputs, including labor, capital and material. There are two notable
patterns from Figure 3.4. First, conditioning on the same amount of labor used, foreign
firms produce more output compared to domestic firms. Nevertheless, such a premium
disappears when conditioning on capital and material. Our estimation thus suggests that
13Our identification exploits the profit-maximizing behavior of firms, thus it is more plausible to compare
private domestic with foreign firms. Furthermore, there are very few transitions between SOE firms and
foreign firms in our sample period.
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technology associated with foreign ownership manifests as labor-augmenting technology (vit
primarily interacts with lit). Second, from the first left panel, foreign dominance appears to
be largest among firms of middle size. For some of the largest firms, such dominance is not
evident, implying that large domestic firms are technologically comparable to foreign firms.
Column 1 in Table 3.2 reports our estimates of the mean elasticities with respect to each
input and the parameters of the Markov process. Overall, our model delivers reasonable
estimates of mean elasticities with respect to capital, labor and material. Capital over labor
ratio is close to 1, reflecting the relatively capital intensive nature of the Tech industries.14
We note that even though we do not impose any parametric assumption on production
functions, the mean elasticity of material inputs is about 0.725, suggesting that the true
production function differs from that of Leontief form.15
In our baseline specification, we find that the mean predicted effect of v is zero, which we
interpret as evidence against a long-term effect on productivity of changing ownership status
from domestic to foreign. The coefficient for d is positive and significant, suggesting a strong
positive selection of firms who switch ownership status. In particular, firms that switch
ownership status have on average a 2.6% productivity premium as compared to firms who
do not, subject to the same Markov process and past productivity ωi,t−1. This is consistent
with the previous literature, which documents the existence of positive selection for foreign
acquisition. Simply put, more productive firms are more likely to be bought out by foreign
investors.
The combination of v and d gives us the immediate effect of changing ownership sta-
tus. The mean short-term effect is 2.6% for all domestic firms. These evaluations at mean
however mask important heterogeneity of the effect. An advantage of the nonparametric
method is that we can recover the entire distribution of an effect. Figure 3.5 illustrates these
14We estimate our model for the textile-related industries and find a much lower ratio. For Textile (17),
this ratio is 0.75. For Garments (18) and Leather (19), this ratio is about 0.5. More results regarding these
sectors are available upon requests.
15An implication of this result is that the use of value-added production function cannot generally be
justified.
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distributions, and we can see that the distribution of long-term effects is symmetric around
zero. On the other hand, the distribution of immediate effects suggests that most domestic
firms that get bought out will have some short-term productivity premium. Nevertheless,
this premium disappears over time.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the heterogeneity of long-term and short-term effects with respect
to firm size, measured by log of employment. The conditional mean function shows that
for firms of smaller size (log(L) ≤ 6), the long-term effect of foreign ownership is negative,
implying that their production processes do not interact well with foreign technology. On
the other hand, firms of larger size benefit substantially from foreign ownership. The long-
term productivity premium for these firms could be as large as about 10%. One potential
explanation for this heterogeneity is that larger firms often have better absorptive capacity,
and hence are better equipped to take advantage of foreign technology and management
practices. This result resonates the recent findings by Fons-Rosen et al. (2018). From
an econometric perspective, the result implies that larger firms’ production structure more
closely resembles that of foreign firms, and hence interacts better with the dummy term
v. Finally, for the short-run effect, our model predicts that all firms would generate some
productivity gains by switching to foreign ownership, and the gain could range from 2% to
13%.
In sum, from our baseline specification, we show that the long-term effect of foreign
investment is generally small and substantially heterogenous across firm sizes. We find
robust evidence of a strong positive selection effect when firms switch from domestic to
foreign ownership status.
3.5.1 HKMT versus OECD
As noted in section 3.1, some evidence suggests that HKMT firms are in fact mainland
Chinese firms, yet they establish their headquarters in offshore locations to access favorable
tax treatments. If this is the case, HKMT firms should not be more productive when
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compared to comparable private domestic firms. We extend our baseline model to examine
this hypothesis.
Specifically, the extension allows HKMT firms to behave differently as compared to
OECD firms by incorporating separate dummies for these two types of firms. This extension
is specified as follow:




it ) + ωit + εit (3.17)
with Markov productivity process:




it + ηit (3.18)
We report results for this extension in column 2 of Table 3.2 and in Figures 3.7-3.9. Strik-
ingly, as illustrated in Figure 3.7, we find that HKMT firms are indeed not more productive
than their domestic counterparts. In contrast, the estimated productivity premium of OECD
firms as compared to domestic firms is now much larger than in the baseline model. As in
the baseline case, the labor-augmenting dominance of OECD as compared to HKMT and
domestic firms disappears for very large firms. Column 2 of Table 3.2 shows that HKMT
firms perform worse than domestic firms, while OECD firms perform better than domestic
firms in the long run. There is common positive selection among firms who switch their
ownership status to either HKMT or OECD type, although the selection effect is stronger
for OECD acquisitions. Firms that switch to HKMT ownership have an estimated 1.8%
productivity premium and firms that switch to OECD ownership have an estimated 3.7%
productivity premium compared to firms that do not switch.
We also illustrate the distribution of the short- and long-term effects, as well as their
heterogeneity in Figures 3.8-3.9. Easily seen is the difference across ownership types: the
distribution of HKMT effects is primarily negative, while the distribution of OECD effects
is mainly positive. This reflects the generally lower estimated productivity of HKMT firms
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as compared to domestic firms.
The productivity premium of OECD firms becomes more apparent when it is disentan-
gled from that of HKMT firms. The top two panels of Figure 3.9 show that HMKT firms
are mostly not more productive than private domestic firms, and that a switch to HKMT
type will not generate productivity gains. In contrast, the bottom panels of Figure 3.9
demonstrate strong patterns of both short- and long-term productivity gains for firms re-
ceiving investment from OECD sources. The long-term effect ranges from 2% to more than
5%, while the short-term effect ranges from 5% to above 10%. As before, this productivity
boost matters for moderately sized firm. Even for OECD investment, the estimated foreign
productivity premium disappears for firms of very large size (log(L) close to 10 in this case).
3.5.2 Non-(Hicks)-neutral Implications
After estimating our model, we can compute the counterfactual elasticities for each firm in
our sample and examine the non-(Hicks)-neutral implications of foreign ownership. This step
provides us with distributions of these elasticities with respect to labor, capital and material.
Recall that if the foreign ownership productivity effect is neutral, these distributions should
not be statistically different under v = 1 versus v = 0. To test for non-neutrality, Table 3.3
shows our simple paired t-test for these elasticities.
In Table 3.3, mean elasticities with respect to labor and capital are larger for foreign firms
compared to domestic firms. On the other hand, the elasticity with respect to material is
larger for domestic firms as compared to their foreign counterparts. These results imply that
foreign technology involves more labor and capital but less material.16 Table 3.4 compares
the elasticity ratios of labor and capital, taking material as a normalized input. Because
for each firm, we hold the input ratios fixed, differences in these elasticity ratios essentially
reflect the differences in MRTS, which directly maps to input factor shares. Table 3.4 shows
16Furthermore, if we impose constant return to scale (CRS) assumption on the physical production
function, we can infer markups induced by different ownership status. Table 3.3 shows that having foreign
ownership increases firms’ markup.
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that MRTSs are higher for foreign firms as compared to domestic firms. Ceteris paribus,
this imply that labor share and capital share of total revenue are lower in foreign firms as
compared to domestic firms. Back-of-envelope calculations imply that labor would have been
1.8% higher in the absence of foreign investment in all firms in our sample.17 This evidence
suggests that foreign investment is non-(Hicks)-neutral biased and may have contributed to
the decline of Chinese labor share during this sample period.
Biased technological change introduced by foreign investment into China’s high-tech man-
ufacturing may also help to explain the observed growth in the domestic value-added share
of Chinese high-tech exports.18 As noted above, our estimates imply that foreign technology
involves more labor and capital inputs relative to material inputs. Foreign-invested firms
were an expanding presence in China’s high-tech sector over our sample period: their share
of total high-tech sales rose from 27.5 percent in 1995 to 44.% in 2005. By 2005, foreign-
invested firms provided almost two-thirds of China’s total high-tech export value.19 Because
foreign technology raises the contribution of domestic labor relative to imported materials,
foreign investment may have contributed to the rising domestic value-added share of the
sector’s exports.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the dynamic and non-(Hicks)-neutral productivity effects of foreign
ownership in China’s high-tech manufacturing industries from 1998-2007. In doing so, we
propose an econometric framework that extends a recent nonparametric productivity esti-
mation method developed by Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017). We explicitly allow for
17We do not make similar calculations for capital because capital might be subject to adjustment cost
which we cannot take into account in our framework.
18According to the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added Project, in 1995 around three-quarters of the
total value of China’s information and computer technology exports reflected foreign content but by 2011
this had fallen to just over half, with similar large declines seen in other high-tech sectors, such as electrical
machinery and transport equipment. See https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/tiva/CN 2015 China.pdf.
19Characteristics of the high-tech sector for 1995 are drawn from Huang (2003), Table 1.4, which is based
on data from China’s Third Industrial Census. Comparable numbers for 2005 are calculated by the authors
from the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises, which is described in the text.
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endogenous productivity process and nonlinear effects of foreign investment. Our approach
enables us to recover the productivity adjustment path of firms following foreign acquisitions
(short- versus long-term effects) and to study the bias of foreign technology embedded in
foreign ownership.
Overall, we find that foreign ownership does bring both short- and long-term productivity
gains, although the long-term effect is generally smaller than the short-term effect. This
is mostly the result of positive selection upon foreign acquisitions. We also find that these
effects display substantial heterogeneity across firm sizes. Domestic medium-sized enterprises
gain the most from access to foreign investment, while the largest firms see no productivity
boost.
Finally, in the context of China, our empirical analysis demonstrates that HKMT firms
are not more productive than their domestic counterparts and only OECD firms deliver a
productivity premium. Comparing OECD-invested firms with domestic firms’ technology, we
find that OECD technology is biased, meaning that it is both labor- and capital-augmenting.
Thus, the foreign-investment productivity boost raises the marginal products of capital and
labor relative to materials. This factor bias may offer further explanation for China’s falling
labor share and for the rising domestic valued added observed in China’s high-tech exports.
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Figure 3.1: Employment Share of HKMT and OECD Firms from 1998 -2007 within Tech
Industries
Note: The Tech group comprises 2-digit manufacturing of: general-purpose machinery (35),
special-purpose machinery (36), transportation equipments (37), electrical machinery (39), com-
munication equipments and computers (40) and precision instruments (41). Employment shares
are calculated based on Chinese firm-level data.
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Figure 3.2: Dynamic Transition Scenarios of Firms Switching Ownership Status
Note: The figure illustrates three dynamic transition scenarios of firms who switch ownership status
from domestic to foreign (FO). (v+d) captures immediate effect while v alone captures the long-run
effect.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution (MRTS) under Factor Biased Coun-
terfactuals
Note: The figure illustrates the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between labor (L)
and material (M) under two counterfactual scenarios: v = 1 verus v = 0.
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Figure 3.4: Predicted f̂(.) against Primary Inputs for Foreign versus Domestic Ownership in Tech Industries
Note: The figure illustrates the relationship between the mean predicted output f̂(.) against mean (log) primary inputs, including labor,
capital and material respectively, for foreign and domestic firms. The estimation results are from the baseline model in equations (1)-(4).
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Short- and Long-term Effects for Firms Switching Ownership
Status
Note: The figure illustrates the distribution of short- (left panel) and long-term (right panel) effects
for firms switching ownership status from domestic (v = 0) to foreign (v = 1). Effects are measured
in percentage point.
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Figure 3.6: Mean Effects by Firm Size (in Log Employment)
Note: The figure illustrates the heterogeneity of short- (left panel) and long-term (right panel)
effects based on firm size (measured in log employment). The heterogeneity is obtained a nonpara-
metric conditional mean regression.
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Figure 3.7: Predicted f̂(.) against Primary Inputs for OECD, HKMT and Domestic Firms in Tech Industries
Note: The figure illustrates the relationship between the mean predicted output f̂(.) against mean (log) primary inputs, including labor,
capital and material respectively, for OECD, HKMT and domestic firms. The estimation results are from the extended model in equations
(17)-(18).
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of Short- and Long-term Effects among Firms Switching Ownership
Status (HKMT versus OECD)
Note: The figure illustrates the distribution of short- (left panel) and long-term (right panel) effects
for firms switching ownership status from domestic to HKMT or OECD firms. Effects are measured
in percentage point.
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Figure 3.9: Mean Effects by Firm Size for HKMT (Top) and OECD (Bottom) Investments
Note: The figure illustrates the heterogeneity of short- (left) and long-term (right) effects based on
firm size (measured in log employment). The heterogeneity is obtained a nonparametric conditional
mean regression. The top panels illustrate short- and long-term effects for HKMT firms. The
bottom panels illustrate short- and long-term effects for OECD firms.
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Table 3.1: Firms and Employment by Ownership Category in 1998 and 2007
Ownership Number of Firms Employment
—————————————– ————————————–
No.98 Pct98 No.07 Pct07 No.98 Pct98 No.07 Pct07
SOE 39,477 33 9,463 3.6 27 57 11 17
Hybrid/Collective 42,297 35 32,414 12 11 24 10 16
Private 18,770 16 170,888 66 3.3 7.1 24 39
Foreign - HKMT 11,480 9.5 22,164 8.5 3.2 6.7 8.2 13
Foreign - OECD 8,228 6.8 25,753 9.9 2.3 5 9.5 15
Total 120,252 100 260,682 100 47 100 63 100
Note: The foreign equity threshold is 25% for both HKMT and OECD firms. Authors’ calculations
are based on the firm-level data.
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Table 3.2: The Model Estimates for Tech Industries
Mean Elasticities and Estimated Parameters GNR1 GNR2







dall (γ) 0.026∗∗∗ .
(4.67)
dHKMT (γ1) . 0.018∗∗∗
(2.58)
dOECD (γ2) . 0.037∗∗∗
(5.42)
v + d 0.026 .
(v + d)HKMT . -0.017
(v + d)OECD . 0.063
ρ 0.895 0.899
Note: z-stats are reported in brackets. All numbers without z-stats are the means of their elasticity
distributions.
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Table 3.3: Paired t-test for Differences between Counterfactual Elasticities (OECD)
Paired t-test N Mean (v = 1) Mean (v = 0) Difference p-value
Labor Elasticity 424610 0.107 0.104 0.003 0.000
Capital Elasticity 424610 0.102 0.088 0.013 0.000
Material Elasticity 424610 0.658 0.696 -0.038 0.000
(Revenue) Return to Scale 0.867 0.888
Markup 15.34 % 12.61 %
Note: The table shows paired t-test results for elasticities under two counterfactuals: v = 1 versus
v = 0. (Revenue) return to scale are sum of mean elasticities. Markups are inferred under the
assumption of constant return to scale of physical production function.
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Table 3.4: Paired t-test for Elasticity Ratios under Factor Bias Counterfactuals (OECD)
Paired t-test N Mean (v = 1) Mean (v = 0) Difference p-value
Labor/Material 424610 0.172 0.154 0.018 0.000
Capital/Material 424610 0.162 0.131 0.031 0.000
Note: The table shows paired t-test results for elasticity ratios under two counterfactuals: v = 1

















3.A Dynamic Interpretation in A Linear Model
Consider the following linear (special) case of our model:
yit = βkkit + βllit + βmmit + βvvit + ωit + εit, (A1)
with the Markov productivity process:
ωit = ρωi,t−1 + γdit + ηit. (A2)
If a firm switches their owner ship status in period t, we would have both vit and dit change
from 0 to 1. Therefore, the immediate gain in productivity i.e. in period t due to this switch
is βv + γ. At the period t + 1, the gain would now be smaller due to stationarity of the
Markov process. We specify the gains as follow:
Period t: βv + γ
Period t+ 1: βv + ργ
Period t+ 2: βv + ρ
2γ
...
Period t+ n: βv + ρ
nγ
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Hence, we have the long-run effect equaled to βv when n→∞.
Table A5: Aggregate Summary Statistics (Monetary Values in Trillion RMB)
Year Number of Firms VA Sales Output Employment Export Fixed Assets (Net)
1998 165118 1.94 6.54 6.77 56.44 1.08 4.41
1999 162033 2.16 7.06 7.27 58.05 1.15 4.73
2000 162882 2.54 8.37 8.57 53.68 1.46 5.18
2001 171256 2.83 0.00 9.54 54.41 1.62 5.54
2002 181557 3.30 10.86 11.08 55.21 2.01 5.95
2003 196220 4.20 13.95 14.23 57.48 2.69 6.61
2004 279092 0.00 19.78 20.17 66.22 4.05 7.97
2005 271835 7.22 24.69 25.16 69.31 4.77 8.95
2006 301961 9.11 31.08 31.66 73.49 6.05 10.58
2007 336768 11.70 39.76 40.51 78.75 7.34 12.34
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